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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a detailed study of the interaction between the Conservative party and 
the National government during the nine months of the 'phoney war'. It concentrates 
on the potential strength of Chamberlain's position and the Conservative party at the 
outbreak of war. The Conservative party entered the Second World War full of 
confidence. The party dominated British politics at a national level. However, 
Chamberlain's failure to widen the government damaged his credibility as a wartime 
leader when Labour's leaders rejected his offer of key seats in the war cabinet of the 
National government. This thesis sets out to analyse to what extent the Conservative 
dominated National government was serious about co-operation with Labour and the 
Liberals. It will also seek to consider the way in which Chamberlain sought to 
construct an efficient working war cabinet and how his failure to do so undermined 
his position as Prime Minister. Chamberlain wanted to fight the war and believed that 
Nazism had to be destroyed, but those who sort to expand the theatre of war and those 
who wanted a peace accord with Nazi Germany weakened his position as Prime 
Minister and helped create the perception that he was not a serious wartime leader. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After a time-consuming effort to keep Britain safe from another European War, 
Neville Chamberlain bowed to the unavoidable. The German invasion of Poland ' 
launched at dawn on 1 September, led to the British and French declarations of war on 
Germany issued on 3 September. The delays in declaring war were taken as proof that 
the appeasers were trying for another Munich. The reality was different: the delay had 
been necessary because of the British government's desire to declare war in unison 
with the French and not because it was giving serious consideration to Mussolini's 
proposal of an international conference. It seems clear that Neville Chamberlain had 
made his mind up that war could not be avoided. The declaration was determined but 
there was an appearance of indecision due to the need to declare war with the French. 1 
Chamberlain, who had been British Prime Minister since May 193 7, presided over the 
British declaration. For him the commencement of conflict was a personal and bitter 
blow, after his stubborn attempts to reach a deal with the European dictators. When he 
spoke to the House of Commons after the declaration, he made no attempt to disguise 
his feelings: 'Everything that I have worked for, everything that I have hoped for, 
everything that I have believed in my public life has crashed into ruins' _2 However, 
Chamberlain was unwilling to resign the Premiership and the fact that Chamberlain 
persisted as Prime Minister and was determined to see the war through says a lot 
1 For historical analysis of the British declaration of war see R.A.C. Parker, 'The 
British Government and the coming of war with Germany', in M.D.R. Foot (ed.), War 
and Society, London, 1973, pp.1-16. 
2 Hansard: House of Commons Debates, vol 350, col 297, 3 Sept. 1939. 
about Chamberlain's strength of character. With nearly 425 Conservative seats to 
Labour's 160, Chamberlain's position seemed invulnerable. It soon became apparent, 
however, that there were elements within the Conservative party who were less than 
satisfied with the National government's prosecution of the war effort. Eight months 
into the war, after a parliamentary revolt following the collapse of Finland and 
Norway, Chamberlain resigned. The following day the Second World War began in 
earnest in Western Europe when German forces invaded the Low Countries and 
France. 
The period before the start of the 'real war' is often described as 'the phoney war' 
or 'the bore war' .3 Before starting the first chapter it will be necessary to place the 
thesis in context; to examine both the historiography of the 'phoney war', the 
Conservative party and the National government and my justifications of the need for 
such a study. 
THE IDSTORIOGRAPHY 
'The phoney war' is often consigned to the margins of history. Conventional thought 
proceeds that it is either tacked on to the end of studies of the 1930s and appeasement, 
or is it treated as a prelude to the 'real conflict' .4 The period actually suffers from 
something of an image problem, especially when contrasted with the dramatic events 
3 The phrase 'phoney war' was American and it only came into British circulation 
later. At the time in Britain, the period was known as the 'bore war' or 'strange war'. 
See A. Calder, The People's War: Britain 1939-1945, London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1969, p.57. In Nazi Germany it was known as the 'Sitzkrieg'. 
4 See, for example, M. Cowling, The Impact of Hitler, Cambridge, University Press, 
1975. And W. Murray, The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1936-39, 
Princeton, University Press, 1984. 
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of the months and years that followed it. Rarely is it treated as a distinct period of 
history and yet it deserves intense scrutiny. The period, which is known as the 
'phoney war' because of the failure of the allied forces to engage the Nazi enemy, was 
to prove crucial in the fall of the Chamberlain administration. The challenge for an 
historian writing about this period is not deciding what to include but rather choosing 
what to exclude. 
Between 1931 and 1940 Britain was administered by a National government. 5 
Begun in August 1931 as a temporary measure to fill the political vacuum created by 
the disintegration of the second Labour government, the National government was 
consolidated into a regime by the 1931 general election. This achieved permanency 
with the electoral mandates of 1931 and 1935. The regime, with a few changes to its 
party composition, stayed the same until May 1940. The advent of war put paid to 
another election, which Chamberlain had intended to call. 
The Conservative party set the agenda for domestic and international politics in the 
1930s to a quite remarkable extent. The consensus today is largely that the National 
government was a sham. No one at the time expressed regret when the regime had 
gone and by the end of the Second World War those tainted by association were, with 
the possible exception of ' Rab' Butler, either literally or politically dead. With 
Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan having enhanced their reputations by distancing 
themselves from the regime, the way was clear for Winston Churchill on his part and 
5G.R. Searle, Country before Party: Coalition and the idea of 'National Government' 
in Modern Britain 1885-1987. London, Longman, 1995. Searle cites other examples 
of this form of government. Coalitions, multi-party groupings and National 
Governments have frequently held power. Examples include most importantly the 
Coalition ministries of the First World War under Asquith and Lloyd George. 
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Labour politicians on theirs to condemn the National government of the 1 930s, which 
has assigned them to the respective wilderness. The historian Charles Loch Mowatt 
wrote in 1 955 of the National government as one ' long diminuendo' which from its 
triumphant beginnings ' shambled its unimaginative way to its fall'. 6 The turn of 
phrase is more reminiscent of Churchill, in its description of the Baldwin-Macdonald 
axis. Whether the Churchill-Attlee axis of the 1 940s and 1 950s was a better thing, it 
certainly was in a position to exploit the built-in negativity about the regime that had 
been defeated. Those excluded from the National Government, like Winston Churchill 
wrote its early history and exploited its most unconstructive points. 7 
In terms of historiography, the Conservative party's and National government 's 
relationship with the 'phoney war' has been analysed from four different perspectives: 
from the ministerial angle;8 assessing the role of a particular individual; examining the 
role of the so-called anti-appeasers;9 from the view of the local constituency 
organisations.10 In the main, the historiography of the 'phoney war' has been 
6 C.L. Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, London, 1 955, p.443, Cited in N. Smart, 
The National Government, London, Longman, 1 999, p.3. 
7 See Churchill 's The Gathering Storm and Cato's Guilty Men as examples of this. 
8 The number of works that can be cited is innumerable, Here are a few more recent 
publications, David Carlton, Anthony Eden: A Political Biography, London, Alien 
Lane, 1 98 1 ;  R.R. James, Anthony Eden, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1 986; J. 
Charmley, Churchill: The End of Glory, London, Hodder and Stougton, 1 993, 
Andrew Roberts, The Holy Fox: The Li fe of Lord Halifax, London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1 991 .  D. Dutton, Simon: A Political Biography, London, Arnold, 1 992. 
9 N. Thompson, The Anti-Appeasers: Conservative Opposition to Appeasement during 
the 1930s, London, 1 97 1 . A recent study by Dr. Larry Witherell of Lord Salisbury's 
Watching Committee examined the role of the Anti-Appeasers during wartime. It will 
be a forthcoming article in the English Historical Review. 
10 N.J. Crowson, Facing Fascism: The Conservative Party and the European 
Dictators, 1935-1940, London, Routledge, 1 997. 
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exclusively concerned with 'elite' history.11 In contrast, historians like Professor 
Ramsden and Dr. Crowson have adopted a 'total concept ' .  These studies have 
demonstrated that when national archives (such as the papers of leading Conservative 
figures) are combined with a comprehensive analysis of the surviving regional and 
constituency records, the historian is able to produce a more balanced account than 
was previously possible.1 2 This has helped remove the 'myth' created by the later 
leadership about divisions in the party. After 1 940 historical interest concerning the 
phoney war era has emphasised the divisions within the party, distinguishing between 
appeasers and anti-appeasers. This has conveniently helped from the perspective of 
the post-war leadership keen to foster the myth of rebellion. Chamberlain's fall from 
power has received a certain amount of analysis. 13 Some of this analysis has too 
readily assumed that Chamberlain's fall from power was inevitable. Paul Addison has 
pointed to Chamberlain's inability to harness the extra parliamentary dimension, in 
this particular instance, the trade unions, which encouraged dissatisfaction with the 
prosecution of the war. 14 Historians in the 1 980s and 1 990s have been affected by the 
11 Cowling, The Impact of Hitler, 1 975. 
12 John Ramsden was in fact the first historian to encompass the local perspective into 
the narrative of the appeasement years in The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, London, 
Longman, 1 978. This volume was a contribution to the Longmans History of the 
Conservative party. In recent years, Ramsden has completed two volumes using the 
same methodological approach on the post 1 940 period, taking the history up to 1 975. 
See also, J .  Ramsden, The Age of Churchill and Eden, 1 995, and The Winds of 
Change: Macmillan to Heath, 1 996. 
13 J. S. Rasmussen, 'Party discipline in wartime: The downfall of the Chamberlain 
Government', Journal of Politics, 32,2 1 970, pp.379-406; K. Jeffreys, ' May 1 940: 
The downfall of Neville Chamberlain', Parliamentary History, 1 0, 3 1 99 1 ,  pp.363-
378. 
14 P. Addison, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War, London, 
Cape, 1 975. 
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reconsideration of Britain's involvement within the Second World War. The fact that 
Britain had stood alone against Hitler for a considerable time was credit to the nation. 
However, historians have considered that perhaps the cost was too high. 15 The 
possibility of peace did not end with the declaration of war over Poland in September 
1 93 9. Hitler was dismayed by the British declaration of war, telling Alfred Rosenburg 
that he ' couldn't grasp' what Chamberlain was 'really after'. 'Even if England 
secured a victory' , the real victors would be the United States, Japan and Russia. 1 6 
Revisionist historians such as John Charmley and Alan Clark have argued that this 
analysis was all too prescient. Britain's victory, they argue, was an insincere one. 
What if the war had gone ahead in 1 939 but Britain had subsequently sought peace 
with Germany? The idea i s  that Germany would have spent itself fighting against 
Soviet Russia, leaving the British E mpire intact, the Conservatives in power and the 
British economy unimpaired. 17 Such a notion is controversial and assumes that 
Hitler's peace offers to Britain were sincere. 
The contrasting approaches to the historiography of the 'phoney war' call into 
question the uses of different sources and the reliability of those sources to enhance 
our understanding of the period. For example, there have been many debates about the 
usefulness of material contained in the Public Record Office. It has been stated that 
'an excessive and narrow concentration of state papers could cloud or bias an 
15 K. Robbins, Appeasement, Oxford, Blackwell. 1 988, p. 1 0. 
1 6 A. Roberts and N. Ferguson, "Hitler's England'. What if Germany had Invaded 
Britain in May 1 940?' In Ferguson (ed.), Virtual History: Alternatives and 
Counterfactuals, London, Papermac, 1 998, p.292. 
17 As argued by J. Charmley, Churchill: The End ofGlory, 1 993. 
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understanding' .1 8 The shortcomings of this approach are highlighted by the emergence 
in the late sixties and early seventies of ' instant history' ,  written to publishers' 
deadlines and often based upon the latest release of public records without any serious 
collation to other sources. This was one of the negative aspects of this redirection. A 
number of historians have been guilty of this approach.19 The problem with the 
overwhelming amount of evidence in the PRO is twofold. The first, still practiced by 
many political biographers and some historians is to simply ignore the PRO. This 
greatly impoverishes their work. They deny themselves knowledge of ministers' 
private remarks during the determination of policy, which can be counter balanced 
with frequently misleading public statements and private conferences. They are less 
able to judge the blends of political and official influence on policy. The outcome of 
this is that political and constitutional myths survive and are reinforced. This was 
certainly true after the war, when some of the myths about the Chamberlain 
administration were created. A second response is simply to sample the most easily 
available classes of records at the PRO and ignore the most obscure. This is 
acceptable but this can only lead the historian to rely on previously used sources and 
fails to dig deeper. The most informed response is to make a prior, informed survey of 
all relevant sources (not just in the PRO) and then determine the validity of all of 
18 R. Lowe, 'Archival Report: Plumbing New depths: Contemporary Historians and 
the Public Record Office,' 20th Century British History, 1 2 ,3, 1 996. p .239 . 
19 C. Barnett based a number of his recent works on material gleaned from the PRO. 
These works include: The Audit of War: The Illusion and Reality of Britain as a great 
Nation, London, 1 986 and The Lost Victory, British Dreams, British Realities 1945-
1950, London, 1 995. Arlother recent example is that of Richard Lamb in his book The 
Macmillan Years: The Emerging Truth, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995. In 
the introduction he states that ' the release by the Public Record Office on the 1 
January 1 994 under the thirty year rule of the fmal archives relating to the Macmillan 
Government enables historians to write about the truth'. 
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them. However, for historians who are seeking to understand the dimensions of policy 
making, there can be no more important an archive. The great advantage of 
government records i s  that ,  correctly used, they can reveal the complete range of 
influences to which the government was subjected to at any one time. 
The reduction in the ' closed period' for official records also encouraged a spate of 
biographies and edited diaries based upon private archives. 20 This has provided an 
additional perspective on the 'phoney war' era. In 1 967 the diaries of a relatively 
obscure Member of Parliament,  Sir Henry Channon were published.2 1  At the time of 
publication the value of the diaries to the historian were underestimated, partly as a 
result of the obscurity of Channon. It was only after A.J.P. Taylor publicly applied the 
adjective 'classic' to them that they became an essential source for historians?2 Of 
course Channon was important. He was Parliamentary Private Secretary to 'Rab' 
Butler who was Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office between 1 938 and 
1 94 1 .  He was a devoted ' Chamberlainite', even after Chamberlain's fall from power. 
However, it should be pointed out that Channon is better remembered as a frivolous 
socialite than political soothsayer. His information was seldom correct and his 
prejudices ran deep. The recently published Headlam diaries edited by Stuart Ball, 
which cover the 'phoney war' period has added an additional perspective in our 
20 There are many recently published diaries dealing with the 'Phoney War' period. 
They include, J. Harvey (ed.), The Diplomatic Diaries of 0/iver Harvey 1937-1939, 
London, Collins, 1 970; N.Nicolson (ed.), The Diaries and Letters ofHarold Nicolson, 
London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1 967. More recently S. Ball (ed.), Parliament and 
Politics in the Age of Churchill and Attlee: The Headlam Diaries, 1935-1951, 
Camden, 5th Series, 9, 1 999. 
21 R.R. James (ed.), 'CHIPS': The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon, London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1 967. 
22 !bid, p.7, preface to the 1 993 edition written by R.R. James. 
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understanding of the period. 23 As an historical source, the main value of the Headlam 
diaries lies in the account they give of political opinions behind the scenes in the 
House of Commons. The official record of the debates may contain the text of the 
speech, but it cannot capture the atmosphere in which it was delivered or reveal what 
MPs thought about it afterwards. Headlam perhaps more revealingly than Channon 
records the gossip of the lobbies and the smoking room, their fluctuating views of 
reputations, potential leaders and election prospects. The Headlam diaries provide a 
remarkable insight into the mood of the Conservative party, both in and outside 
1. 24 par 1ament. 
Memoirs I have treated with reservation. They are often written to justify the career 
and attainments of the author. Certainly from the perspective of the phoney war 
period, memoirs are numerous.25 However, winners not losers will write their 
memoirs and certainly from an historian's point of view the case for the defence of 
Chamberlain's wartime record is under-developed. The ideal situation for the 
researcher is when a diary remains in bulk, is deposited to a University library and a 
student can confirm or embellish some entry in the published selection that may have 
caught the eye. 
Political biographies have been useful. In particular, Andrew Roberts' acclaimed 
23 Ball (ed.), Head/am Diaries. 
24 During the 'phoney war' period, Cuthbert Headlam was not an MP in the House of 
Commons. He had lost his Durham seat in 1 935. However, he was in contact with 
sitting members of the House. 
25 These include: J. Simon, Retrospect, London, Collins, 1952, Earl Winterton, Orders 
of the Day, London, Cassell, 1 953, Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget, London, Collins, 
1953, Lord Halifax, The Fullness of Days, London, Cassell, 1 957. 
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biography of Lord Halifax, The Holy Fox. 26 Certain books illuminate particular 
aspects of a period and yet stand as worthy histories on their own; Paul Addison's The 
Road to 1945, Richard Cockett ' s  Twilight of Truth and John Ramsden' s  The Age of 
Balfour and Baldwin. 
THE THESIS 
The principal primary sources for my research have come from a number of private 
papers. At Birmingham University of course there are the Chamberlain and Eden 
papers. The weekly letters to Chamberlain's sisters, Hilda and Ida, are both very 
personal and political. They reveal to the historian Chamberlain' s description of his 
intentions and justifications of his actions as late as 1 940.27 Many historians over the 
last t wenty years have benefited from using the Chamberlain papers, especially the 
letters to his sisters. I make no apology for continuing this tradition. As well as using 
familiar sources such as the Chamberlain, Eden and Butler papers, I have tried to use 
sources, which are less familiar to provide some conceptualisation of views which, 
although they date from the 1 930s, are relevant, I believe, to the period of study. The 
Brabourne collection at the India Office Library in London, now part of the British 
Library, was of assistance for me in understanding Conservatism before the war. The 
regular correspondence, which passed between 'Rab' Butler and Brabourne from 
1 933 to Braboume's death in 1 939, provides valuable source material for 
understanding the politics of both Britain and its empire in the 1 930s. 
26 A. Roberts, The Holy Fox, London, Weidenfeld and Nicoloson, 1 99 1 .  
27 R.A.C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of 
the Second World War, London, Macmillan, 1 993, p. 1 0. 
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The Conservative party archives at the Bodleian were most useful in looking at 
party policy at the outbreak of war, in analysing the views towards an accommodation 
with Labour. Also the regular correspondence between Central Office and the local 
associations reveal concerns within the Conservative party about the conflict between 
the 'moral' of helping the war effort and that of assisting the more partisan efforts of 
helping the party. However, the Bodleian has its limitations, as some of the pre-1 940 
correspondence between Central Office and the constituencies has been lost. Joseph 
Ball, a former director of the Conservative Research Department (CRD), destroyed 
much of the pre 1 940 CRD archive. The historian can make up for the shortcomings 
in lack of material by looking in other areas. When examining the issue of cross party 
co-operation I found some of the most useful material could be found in the Ministry 
of Information files at the PRO. For Labour's response to Chamberlain' s  overtures I 
have used published primary sources such as the Dalton diaries and various 
monographs relating to Labour party history?8 There was not adequate time to consult 
the Labour party archives in Manchester. I would suggest that Opposition archives 
could be consulted as part of further research on this topic to view Chamberlain's 
coalition kite flying, from the other side. 
In examining the issue of pro-appeasement in the party I visited the Bristol 
Records Office to look at the Culverwell papers. The Bristol West Conservative 
association continued to function during wartime so the relevant papers still survive 
dealing with Culverwell's  reprimand for pacifism. Many local associations ceased to 
28 B.Pimlott (ed.), The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton 1918-1940, London, Cape, 
1 986. S. Brooke, Labour's War: The Labour Party and the Second World War, 
Oxford Historical Monographs, 1 992. 
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continue during wartime. This is why I have not undertaken a fuller examination of 
Conservative local association material. In short, there is very little. I have relied on 
secondary sources for references to local association minutes. 29 I did attempt to 
plough for more information on Cyril Culverwell's  views by writing to his immediate 
family for access to his private papers. Regrettably that access was denied. 
This thesis is about the Conservative party and the National government during 
the 'Phoney war'. It is divided conveniently into two chapters, the first deals with the 
Conservative party, the second, the National government. The first chapter attempts to 
analyse the state and strength of the party at the outbreak of war. It goes on to argue 
about the strength of Chamberlain's position as Prime Minister. It strives to focus 
purely on the activity of the party and not the government. However, as often is the 
case, themes overlap between chapters one and two. I have tried to avoid the chapters 
being read as two separate entities. There is a lack of chronology as I have tried to 
focus on particular sub themes which are relevant to each chapter; for example, 
Chamberlain's attempts to construct a war cabinet focus very much on the 
government approach which is important to Chapter two. The central theme of this 
thesis is that there is clear evidence to suggest that Chamberlain was serious about 
including Labour in a wartime coalition government. The evidence for this can be 
found in letters to his sisters, Ida and Hilda. His thinking on the composition of the 
wartime government can also be revealed by another document. The slip of paper is 
undated but clearly from the days before the outbreak of war. His known desire to 
bring the Labour party into government , although as a junior partner, is revealed by a 
29 N.J. Crowson, Facing Fascism: The Conservative Party and the European 
Dictators, 1935-1940, 1 997. 
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list of 'possible places for Labour ' .  30 This is a document that has not previously been 
remarked upon by historians (with the exception of Richard Mee who was the first to 
highlight this point in his own PhD thesis).3 1 I have tried to balance this evidence 
against Chamberlain' s personal dislike of the Labour party and his concerns about 
fighting on a ' total war' economy, which would mean the introduction of large 
amounts of socialist legislation and would go against Tory principles of laissez-faire 
and a balanced budget. 
There are omissions in this thesis and some issues I have passed over in silence, for 
example, relations between the trade unions and the National government. As stated 
earlier if it had been possible to conduct more research I would have been able to look 
in more detail at relations with the Liberal and Labour parties. However, it must be 
stated that my specific intention was to examine how the war impacted upon the 
Conservative party and the National government and the perceptions, true or false, 
created about Chamberlain's handling of the war. 
3° Chamberlain MSS: Undated slip of paper, NC 2/29/37. This must have been written 
around the time of the Nazi -Soviet pact, August 3 1 st 1 93 9. 
3 1  Mee, R., 'The Foreign Policy of the Chamberlain Wartime Administration, 
September 1 939-May 1 940,' unpublished University of Birmingham Ph.D., 1 998. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE CONSERVAT IVE PARTY AT WAR, SEPTEMBER 
1939 TO MAY 1940 
INTRODUCTION 
In the early months of the war there was a re-newed sense of party unity, in part 
facilitated by the return to office of Churchill and Eden. However, the 
disappointments of 'the phoney war' , in which Britain stood passively by whilst 
Poland and then Finland were destroyed, inflicted serious damage upon the party's  
prestige. This chapter sets out to analyse the state and strength of the Conservative 
party at the outbreak of war and asks to what extent the Conservative dominated 
National government was serious about co-operation with Labour and the Liberals. It 
will also seek to question the extent to which the Labour party threatened the 
Conservative maj ority at the outbreak of war. 
THE STRENGTH OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AT THE OUTBREAK 
OF WAR 
The Conservative party entered the Second World War in 1 93 9  full of confidence, 
which reflected its own recent history and electoral success. The party dominated 
British politics at a 'national' level. It had won parliamentary majorities in five of the 
last seven General Elections. No other party had secured a one-party majority since 
1 906; but in 1 924, 1 93 1  and 1 93 5  Conservative MPs had taken two thirds of the seats 
in the House of Commons, whilst in the two elections of the 1 930s the party had 
secured more than half of the popular vote. This was to be the last occasion in the 
20th century in which a single party was able to do so. 'Rab' Butler outlined the view 
14 
shared by many Conservatives. 
What I feel about politics at present is that the opposition are so weak as not to 
be dangerous. There is no alternative government in sight. All the by-elections 
have gone our way and this does not mean trouble in the near future, rather the 
reverse.' 
At a local level this dominance was less secure: the London County Council had been 
under Labour control since 1934, Labour was gaining ground at the level of local 
government and several other industrial cities were also Labour dominated and it was 
still the only party in most urban coalfield districts. 
One of the interesting features of Conservative politics in the 1930s and it is a 
feature that is reflected in the 'Twilight War' period, is the supremacy of the party 
leadership which had been established by Baldwin and Chamberlain in 1931. The 
party leadership after the formation of the National government was never again to be 
pressured either from the backbenches or the Press Barons? There were battles over 
particular policies, unemployment pay, India and foreign policy, but this only 
temporarily caused upset to the regime's stability and purpose. 3 The political 
generation that included Chamberlain had been brought into the Bonar Law/Baldwin 
Ministry of 1922-23. They had steered the party through the period to 1939 and the 
1 Brabourne MSS: letter from Butler to Brabourne, 1 July 1937, Eur. F. 97/12-14. 
2 The exception to this is the resignation of the Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare in 
December 1935. During the resignation debate, Baldwin had portrayed the decision as 
being a consummate reaction to the outcry of public opinion. Hoare's resignation was 
in fact the result of backbench pressure, not of public opinion. 
3 J. Ramsden, The Age of Churchill and Eden, 1940-1957, London, Longman, 1995, 
pp.1-2. 
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older men who had returned from coalitionist exile in 1 924 had died, retired or (like 
Churchill) been sidelined again by 1 939. When Chamberlain became Prime Minister 
in May 1 93 7 his cabinet contained only men who owed their posts to Bald win or 
himself. Conformists like R.A. Butler moved steadily up through the ranks, in his case 
as junior minister at the India and Labour departments and then as Commons 
spokesman for the Foreign Office, prior to what would have been an easy move into 
the cabinet in 1 940; rebels like Harold Macmillan still awaited their first government 
post. Indeed such was his frustration that Macmillan had given consideration to the 
formation of a British popular front, or 'centre party' , comprising the left of the 
Conservatives and the right of Labour under the possible leadership of Herbert 
Morrison.4 
The government in power between 1 93 1  and 1 940 is often described as 'National ' .  
Few historians would describe i t  as a coalition government, with the exception of 
Maurice Cowling. 5 However, it had its coalitionist aspects as it included members of 
both the Labour and Liberal parties. 6 The administration was a regime that endured 
due to Conservative support and which was at any time subject to the Conservative 
veto. In short, the Conservative party was able to govern on their own and under their 
4 N.J. Crowson, "'Much ado about nothing". Harold Macmillan and appeasement' in 
R. Aldous and S. Lee (eds.), Harold Macmillan: Aspects of a Political life, 
Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1 999, p. 70. 
5Cowling, The Impact of Hitler, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1 975, p. l .  
6 Those who were Labour and Liberal members of the National Government were 
referred to as 'National Labour' or 'National Liberal' members of the House. In the 
1 935 General Election the party had won the second biggest election victory ever: 54 
per cent of the national vote and 432 MPs who supported the National government in 
a House of 6 1 5. Cited in J. Ramsden, An Appetite for Power-A History of the 
Conservative Party, London, Harper Collins, 1 998, pp.284-285 . At the outbreak of 
war there were 425 Conservative seats to Labour' s 1 60. In the war cabinet there were 
two Liberal Nationals, Sir John Simon and Leslie Hore-Belisha. 
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own banner. They did not choose to govern alone. However, some historians and 
commentators have suggested that the Conservatives formed the National government 
in order to keep the Labour party out of office for at least a generation. 7 This was 
because the party set the agenda for domestic politics in the 1 920s and 1 930s to a 
quite remarkable extent. The adherence to the Tory ranks of significant sections of the 
old Liberal party, first as Liberal Unionists and latterly as Liberal Nationals in the 
National government, enabled the party to claim to be something more than just 
another political grouping. Ross McKibbin has suggested that the Conservatives 
managed between the wars to define 'the public interest' in a way that suited them and 
then to claim it almost as their private preserve. They had an overwhelming presence 
in the popular press for most of the inter-war period and also in the influential new 
medium of newsreel; the newly arrived BBC was the most conformist of all the media 
and unwilling to shatter the establishment's easy assurance. With the majority of the 
media sharing a broad approach to what was acceptable politics, it was impossible for 
Labour to contest the central position in national life to which the Conservatives had 
assigned themselves. 8 
Paul Addison has stated that 'the salient political fact of the last year of peace was 
the continuing strength and self-confidence of the Chamberlain government. They 
feared the power of Germany in Europe, but not the power of the opposition in 
domestic politics.'9 This strength was based on Chamberlain's personal hold over his 
7 N. Smart, The National Government, 1931-1940, London, Longman, 1 998, p.2. 
8 R. McKibbin, Ideologies of Class, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1 990, p. 1 6. See also R. 
Cockett, The Twilight of Truth: Chamberlain, Appeasement and the Manipulation of 
the Press, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1 989. 
9 P. Addison, 'Political Change in Britain, 1 939-1 940', D. Phil. thesis, University of 
Oxford, cited in Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, London, Longman, 1 978, 
p.369. 
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party; as long as he was supported by the Conservative majority in the House of 
Commons he need have no fear of Labour, and as long as he had the freedom to have 
whom he chose in government he remained absolutely in control of government 
policy. 
Chamberlain was not closed to new ideas and approaches; the party machine was 
embarking on the reconstruction of its youth movement following the Fraser report. 
Most importantly it was developing a strong current in domestic reform when 
Chamberlain became Prime Minister. It was privately considering for inclusion in its 
next manifesto items such as extensions to pensions, which would pre-empt the 
Beveridge report in 1942.10 It is easy to get carried away with the failure of the 
Chamberlain administration's war record and the inevitability of his fall in 1940. 
However, that process was far from inevitable and the issue that is rarely addressed is 
how a man who confessed that he was 'never meant to be a war Minister', 11 whose 
leadership was founded on an 'unbroken record of failure' 12 and whose demise was 
predicted as soon as war began, managed to keep his Government united and remain 
as Prime Minister for as long as he did. 
CHAMBERLAIN'S CONSERVATISM 
Chamberlain did not call himself a Conservative when leading his party. He did not 
hold views that could be called mainstream Conservative. In his background, he had 
10 J. Ramsden, The Making of Conservative Party Policy: The Conservative Research 
Department since 1929, London, Longman, 1980, pp 90-92. 
1 1  Chamberlain MSS: NC to Ida Chamberlain, 10 Sept. 1939. NC 18/111116. 
12 Margesson MSS: Cited in 'Chamberlain a Candid Portrait', MRGN, 1/5. This is an 
eight and a half page document. The author may in fact be Duff Cooper and is 
unlikely to be Margesson. 
1 8  
been a Liberal Unionist like his father. The party only reverted to ' Conservative' in a 
national sense in 1 925. Local organisations were free to adopt any title they wished. 
In Birmingham official candidates of the Conservative party were selected and backed 
by the Birmingham Unionist association until after the Second World War. Thus, 
Neville Chamberlain was never actually selected as a Conservative MP. This is 
important in understanding his views on National government and in the forming of 
coalitions. He privately welcomed the advent of the National government in 1 93 1  
because it provided a chance 'that we may develop into a National party and get rid of 
that odious title of Conservative which has kept so many of us from joining in the 
past' . 13 Chamberlain was attracted to the idea of an open-ended party of anti-
socialists under a national label. Nor could Chamberlain be called a Conservative in 
his opinions, for he had little time for the preservation of old and tired methods where 
new ones seemed more likely to be effective, and even less time for the preservation 
of privilege merely because it was inherited. He once described himself to Samuel 
Hoare as a socialist, and he was often nearer to Fabian socialists than to the bulk of 
Conservative opinion in his wider view of domestic policy; with the Fabians he 
shared optimism about social progress. He also showed an obsession with 
administrative methods. 14 Peter Clarke describes Chamberlain as 'more of a 
provincial businessman in politics than a traditional Conservative' .15 However, 
Chamberlain was a Conservative on the big issue of running the economy. In this 
13 Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, pp.355-56. 
14 See, his period as Minister for Health, 1 924-29. K. Feiling's The Life of Neville 
Chamberlain, London, Macmillan, 1 946, pp. 1 26- 1 48. Also D. Dilks, Neville 
Chamberlain: Pioneering and Reform, 1869-1929, Vol 1 ,  Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1 984. 
15 P. Clarke, A Question of Leadership: From Gladstone to Thatcher, London,Hamish 
Hamilton, 1 99 1 ,  p. 1 1 5 .  
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sense he was closer to the old orthodoxies of laissez-faire, essentially pursuing a 
'good housekeeping policy whist waiting for the natural self-righting forces of the 
free market to bring a return to prosperity'. His business mind made him a perfect 
executor of that strategy. 16 The significance of Chamberlain's approach to 
Conservatism was highlighted by his acceptance speech as the new Prime Minister at 
Caxton Hall in June 1 937: 
I recall that I myself was not born a little Conservative. I was brought up as a 
Liberal and afterwards as a Liberal Unionist. The fact that I am here accepted by 
you Conservatives as your leader, is to my mind a demonstration of the 
catholicity of the Conservative party 1 7 
Chamberlain always regarded the national status of the government as a reality. It is 
easy to argue that by 1 937 the National government was merely a facade for 
Conservative rule. As long as it remained National there remained a clear guarantee 
that it would seek to be broader than a partisan government even when made up of 
largely Conservatives; that it would govern in the national rather than the party 
interest. This appealed to Chamberlain, and this helped it continue to enjoy wider 
support than a Conservative government would have been likely to acquire. 
16 !bid, p. 1 1 9. 
1 7 Quoted from The Times, 1 June 1 937, Cited in Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and 
Baldwin, p. 356. 
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THE STRENGTH OF NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN'S POSITION AS PRIME 
MINISTER 
The sources that are available to the historian will never allow for a satisfactory 
answer as to why Chamberlain survived for so long as Prime Minister. As Nick Smart 
has pointed out, Chamberlain's supporters were loyal to the end; more numerous than 
his opponents, but few of them kept diaries or wrote letters which reveal the 
autonomy of their loyalty. 18 Winners not losers will write their memoirs and certainly 
from an historian's point of view the case for the defence of Neville Chamberlain's 
wartime record is under-developed in relation to the prodigious output of the 
dissidents and emphasis of historians on the road to war. The sources are strong 
amongst well-informed people in September 1939 that the life expectancy of the 
Chamberlain wartime administration was expected to be very short indeed. The news 
that the Labour party and the Sinclairite Liberals had turned down offers to join the 
government prompted the damning verdict from one critic that Chamberlain was a 
'fool' and 'mean minded' .19 
In fact, Chamberlain's position as Prime Minister and leader of his party appeared 
as secure in war as it had been in peace. Despite the fact that there was a strong 
feeling that the Chamberlain administration would not last, it does not make 
Chamberlain's defeat and Churchill's succession to the premiership in May 1940 
inevitable. What was to prove crucial in the early months was the perceived suitability 
of a minister for conducting the war. Chamberlain was no less determined than 
Churchill that the war should be seen through to a successful conclusion. However, as 
18 Smart, The National Government, p. 206 
19 Crookshank MSS: diary 29 Sept. 1939, MSS. Eng. D.360. 
21 
is often the case, the Westminster and Fleet Street rumour machines could not resist 
speculating upon who might succeed Chamberlain. It is interesting to note that on 11 
October the anti-Tory Daily Mirror gave Churchill the credit for insisting in cabinet 
upon the rejection of Hitler's peace offer, despite the fact that Chamberlain had been 
equally opposed to it. When the war was only a month old, Oliver Harvey, a Foreign 
Office civil servant with an already jaded view of Chamberlain, wrote that 'the 
government isn't broad enough or strong enough' ,  and 'expected it to fall before 
Christmas' .20 John Colville writing just before his appointment as Downing Street 
Secretary, considered 'it would probably be a good thing if Chamberlain resigned 
soon', but considered that Churchill was 'rather old' to succeed.2 1  The view that 
Chamberlain was doomed and that he would be replaced, possibly by Churchill, was 
commonplace in the autumn of 1939. Euan Wallace, who was Transport Minister, 
found that 'Winston, had taken a long step towards being a future Prime Minister. '22 
Chamberlain himself had once commented that the nearer war came then the better 
Churchill's chances of returning to office, but not as Prime Minister?3 Once war 
broke out Churchill's standing within the party had improved. This transformation in 
his fortunes had been quite remarkable; a few months earlier, in July 1939, it was 
reported that four out of five backbenchers would not tolerate his inclusion in the 
Cabinet. 24 Churchill's opposition to Indian reform and his role in the abdication crisis 
had left him isolated on the fringes of the party. But the end of 1939 talked him along 
20 J. Harvey (ed.), The Diplomatic Diaries ofOliver Harvey, Oct.5 1939. pp.324-25. 
21 J. Colville, The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries, 1939-1941, Volume 
One, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1985, 28. Sept. 1939. p.85. 
22 Wallace MSS: Diary. Entry for 26 Sept. 1939, MSS. Eng. Hist. 495 (1939). 
23 Chamberlain MSS: NC to Ida Chamberlain, 23 Apr. 1939, NC 18/1 11095. 
24 Crowson, Facing Fascism, p. 185. 
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with Halifax as a successor to Chamberlain. John Charmley has compared Churchill' s  
position with that of Lord Kitchener in the Great War: 'he was taken by the nation as 
a symbol of the determination to win the war, and if he was damaged in the eyes of 
the public, then the war effort and the reputation of the government would suffer 
accordingly' .25 When local party branch secretaries in North West Suffolk were 
canvassed in November 1939 as to whom they considered to be the four most popular 
Ministers, Churchill' s  name was listed by 63 per cent and Chamberlain's by 53 per 
cent.26 Even, Channon, who was a Chamberlain loyalist, wrote: 
There will be a 'glamorous' central government, reinforced by extreme Left 
Conservatives and some Socialists who are already saying that while they have 
refused to serve under Neville that they would agree to serve under Winston. I 
see it coming. 27 
However, both Whitehall and certain government ministers remained suspicious of 
Churchill. 'Rab' Butler described Churchill's radio broadcast of 12 November as 
'beyond words vulgar' .28 Lord Stanhope, Churchill's predecessor at the Admiralty, 
informed Leo Amery that 'Winston' s first act of state on reaching the Admiralty was 
to order a bottle of Whisky' and doubted whether he would stay the course after years 
25 J. Charmley, Churchill: The End of Glory, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1993, 
p.377. 
26 The original questionnaire is to be found in Mass Observation Archive, TB:file5/H, 
'Somerset De Chair questionnaire and responses, Nov. 1939' .  Cited in Crowson's 
Facing Fascism, p. 185. 
27 Rhodes James (ed) Chips, 6 Sept. 1939, p.218. 
28 Colville, The Fringes of Power, 29th Oct. 1939, p.50-5 1. 
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of soft living?9 
Historians have pointed to the fact that Churchill was encouraging newspaper 
criticism in order to stiffen up the war effort. This remains uncertain. There may have 
been deliberate attempts to undermine Chamberlain's position for Churchill's own 
benefit.30 In January 1940 Churchill warned W.P. Crozier 'that the war effort must be 
intensified' ;  he also complained of the slow rearmament programme.3 1  However, 
what is certain is that having only recently returned to office, Churchill would not risk 
being implicated in the fall of an administration of which he was a member. The 
Conservative party would not forgive such treachery. This all helped strengthen the 
position of Chamberlain as Prime Minister. 
Chamberlain was weary at the prospect of having to face Labour and the Liberals' 
continued hostility from across the Commons Chamber. Chamberlain himself was not 
surprised by their preference to pursue the role of loyal opposition with a man they 
clearly despised.32 In many ways this actually made things easier for Chamberlain. He 
could bring the other party leaders into his confidence when the national interest 
demanded it, whilst at other times he could enforce his authority over the House with 
29 J. Bames and D. Nicholson (eds.), The Empire at Bay, The Leo Amery Diaries, 
1929-1945, London, Hutchinson, 1988, 5 Sept. 1939, p.572. 
30 R. Cockett, Twilight of Truth, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989, pp. 15 1-
152. Cockett is making an overall point about attempts to undermine Chamberlain's 
position. 
3 1 !bid, p. 151. In gathering public opinion about the war effort, Manchester Guardian 
Journalist W.P. Crozier was been alerted to the complacency and inefficiency in 
government circles by a variety of sources. These sources included Robert V ansittart 
and Brendan Bracken who was Churchill's PPS. This is the main source for evidence 
of Churchill attempting to stiffen the war effort. 
32 G. Stewart, Burying Caesar: Churchill, Chamberlain and the Battle for the Tory 
Party , London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1999, p.386. 
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a majority that still exceeded 200. With such a huge majority, it is worth asking to 
what extent Labour threatened the Conservative dominated National government. 
THE EXTENT OF THE LABOUR PARTY THREAT? 
On the 1 September 1939 Chamberlain had invited the Labour party to join his 
government. The executive of the Parliamentary party refused. When 'Rab' Butler, 
who was Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, asked Hugh Dalton why they had 
refused, Dalton replied that Labour could not enter a Cabinet in which Chamberlain 
and Simon were numbers one and two: and would also require the influence of 
Horace Wilson to be eliminated. 33 As long as Chamberlain and his men continued to 
hold the key positions, they would be the ultimate controllers. Labour's position was 
ambiguous; they supported the war effort, and yet this required collaboration with the 
government. Hugh Dalton expressed Labour's delicate position in his diary: 
Our attitude towards the Government is one of cold, critical, patriotic 
detachment. Alternatively, we shall act as patriotic gadflies on ministers. We 
shall be free to criticise if we think fit in the house, and the so-called political 
truce whereby no contested elections take place for the time being is subject to 
termination at any time at our discretion. 34 
A 'gentleman's agreement' of 5 September 1939 was the most important aspect of 
33 B. Pimlott (ed.), The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton 1918-1940, London, Cape, 
1986, 6 September 1939, p.297. 
34 !bid, p.297. 
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Labour's support for the war.35 On that day, the National Executive's  Election 
subcommittee, chaired by Barbara Ayrton Gould, considered an informal conversation 
which Arthur Greenwood had undertaken with David Margesson, the government 
Chief Whip, concerning the possibility of an electoral truce between the three parties 
for the duration of the war. On 8 September, the Chief Whips of the three major 
parties signed an electoral truce covering by-elections. This agreement meant the 
party which had previously won the seat would have the right, when it fell vacant, to 
nominate a candidate unopposed by the other two parties. Labour party historians 
have tended to view the by-election truce as appropriate for wartime and part of 
Labour's tactic of waiting patiently for the rewards of office.36 However, for Labour 
their power to challenge the government was limited. They were not numerous 
enough to pose any direct challenge to the government. Trade Union co-operation was 
vital to the war effort. This was not the parliamentary leadership's to give or 
withhold; the lingering possibility of a general election was always there as an 
argument for non-provocative caution.37 Labour's position was similar to that of 
Bonar Law in 1 9 1 4, in that they felt that perhaps events would turn in their favour. 
The Conservatives continued to allege that this was a 'political truce' between the two 
parties. Perhaps this was a way of subordinating Labour, by bringing an electoral 
truce into play, yet at the same time keeping Labour fmnly in opposition. The 'by-
election truce' was so disliked by Labour constituency activists that 5 1  resolutions 
calling for its termination were put on the agenda for the May 1 940 party 
35 LPA, Elections Subcommittee minutes, 5 Sept 1 939. Cited in S. Brooke' s  Labour 's 
War: A History of the Labour Party during the Second World War, Oxford Historical 
Monographs, 1 992, p.3 7. 
36 H. Pelling, A Short History of the Labour Party, London, Macmillan, 1 96 1 ,  p.85. 
37 Attlee to Middleton, 25 January 1 940. Cited in Brooke's Labour 's War, p.40. 
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conference. 38 As one Labour activist in Scotland was to recall, 'the Labour candidate 
had been selected in 1939 and we wanted him to stand but, because of this pact the 
Tories were allowed to select'. 39 Labour was also made powerless by the 'phoney 
war'. There was much to grumble about, but the lack of military activity made it 
difficult to mount a strategic attack on the government. ' Constructive Opposition' left 
Labour in a difficult position. They were neither in government or outright opposition. 
However, an important aspect of constructive opposition and independence was the 
party's articulation of an alternative view of the war. This rested on the premise that 
war could serve as a vehicle for social change. Attlee did much to press this point both 
at Westminster and within Transport House. Before this could be done, however, he 
had to endure an awkward challenge to his leadership. 
Clement Attlee had been unwell in the early months of the war. He had returned to 
take over the leadership of the party on 20 September. There were genuine doubts 
about his state of health, as to whether he was fit to carry on.40 The Attlee line was 
that Labour would not serve in a Chamberlain-led government; he insisted on the 
NEC placing a veto on any member of the party who joined the government. It was 
the formal position of the Labour party and yet the party leadership did digress from 
this position a number of times during the 'phoney war'. 
Though the party had refused to participate formally in government, the war did 
bring closer contact between Transport House and Whitehall. Links between the party 
38 Addison, The Road to 1945, London, Cape, 1975, p.58. 
39 Cited from D. Weinbren (ed.), Generating Socialism: Recollections of Life in the 
Labour Party, Stroud, Sutton Publishing, 1997, p.143. The activist was Alex Kitson, 
the constituency was Midlothian. 
40 Attlee underwent two operations for prostate trouble. See C. Attlee, As it 
Happened, London, Hart Davis, 1954, p. 105. 
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and the administration were established on various levels in September 1 939. Party 
agents and trade union officials were instructed by the National Executive to assume 
places on the local and regional committees of the Ministry of Information.41 At the 
parliamentary level various front benchers took up official contacts with particular 
government ministers and departments: Philip Noel Baker with the Ministry of 
Information, Lord Macmillan; Hugh Dalton with Kingsley Wood at the Air Ministry; 
A.V. Alexander with Churchill at the Admiralty; and H.B.  Lees-Smith with Leslie 
Hore-Belisha at the War Office. Greenwood served as liaison with Downing Street . 
Such links afforded valuable access to government departments. 
Historians often claim that Chamberlain was unconcerned at Labour's rejection of 
his invitation to serve in his wartime government.42 However, we do not know on 
what terms Chamberlain made his offer to Greenwood. Also we do not know whether 
the Labour refusal was grounded in principle, or as for Sinclair, resulted from vain 
efforts to argue the price over admission to the 'innermost councils' .43 Sinclair was 
offered the post of Secretary of State for Scotland and refused. Perhaps Dalton would 
have considered office in a Chamberlain-led government. His scathing references to 
the ' secretary of state for the latrines' suggest that he had not entirely closed the door 
on future approaches.44 That Dalton continued to discuss the party leadership question 
with Greenwood after Attlee's return was perhaps more than a sign of concern about 
4 1  LPA, NEC minutes, (4) 1 939-40, 2 Sept. 1 939, cited in Brooke's Labour 's War, 
p.37. 
42 See, for example, K. Jefferys, The Churchill Coalition and Wartime Politics, 1940-
1945, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1 99 1 ,  p . 17 .  
43 Smart, The National Government, p.208. 
44 Pimlott (ed.), Dalton Diary, 18 Sept. 1 939, p.30 1 .  
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the leader's  health.45 Dalton also continued to meet with dissident Conservatives like 
Harold Macmillan. Dalton considered that Attlee was neither 'big enough nor strong 
enough to carry the burden'.  46 
The challenge to Attlee's leadership turned out to be a false alarm. The fact that it 
took place at all appears to suggest a weakness within the Labour party leadership, or 
perhaps that wartime politics did not differ so much from peacetime. The speculation 
about the future of the Chamberlain administration did not cease, despite the 
realisation that the wartime government had thrown off its early jitters, and, far from 
'creating its own unpopularity', was doing rather well. 47 The confident September 
predictions that the government would collapse were now fading. For Labour's 
leaders it seemed that nothing would relieve the tedium and impotence of 
'constructive opposition' .48 
As stated earlier co-operation between the two parties was encouraged. In the 
House of Commons liaison arrangements were stabilised between the government and 
opposition front benches, whereby a government minister would occasionally give his 
Labour opposite number a confidential briefing on some aspect of wartime policy. 
This was not particularly ground breaking, but it illustrated Conservative realisation 
of the growing stature of Labour. However, Chamberlain was still able to retain 
certain confidential aspects of the conduct of the war from other parties. In the sixth 
war cabinet meeting, a discussion was held on the issue of confidential information 
being given to the opposition parties. The war cabinet came to the conclusion that 'it 
45 K. Harris, Attlee, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982, p. 167. 
46 Pimlott (ed.), Dalton Diary, 18 Sept. 1939, p.301. 
47 Pimlott, Hugh Dalton: A Political Biography, London, 1985, p.272. 
48 Smart, The National Government, p.209. 
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was not possible for His Majesty' s Government to share responsibility with the 
leaders of the Parliamentary Opposition and that no information could be given as a 
matter of right' .  The minutes go on to conclude that 'the maintenance of the principle 
set out above, there was no objection to the ministers concerned maintaining informal 
contacts with the leaders of the opposition' .49 This all helped strengthen 
Chamberlain's  hand. As John Colville, Chamberlain's  assistant private secretary, 
recorded in his diary: 
After Questions the PM saw Attlee and Greenwood, and afterwards Sir A 
Sinclair, to harangue them about the disloyalty of the opposition whom, 
oblivious to the fact that we are at war, is seeking every opportunity to criticise 
the government and increase their difficulties. 50 
There were those in the Parliamentary Labour party who were dissatisfied with 
constructive opposition. The electoral truce had taken place as the most convenient 
course for the parliamentary leadership and Transport House. Aneurin Bevan, 
increasingly the most important voice of the Labour left, argued that the path of 
'voluntary totalitarianism' which the truce represented would lead to the party's  
extinction as a vital political force.5 1  Discomfort with the truce was not confined to 
the left. In December, the New Statesmen reported that only a small majority had 
renewed the National Executive's  commitment to the electoral truce.52 With relations 
49 PRO: War Cabinet Minutes 6, 8th Sept. l 939, CAB 65/6. 
5° Colville, The Fringes of Power, Oct. 24 1 939, p.49. 
51 Cited in Brooke's  Labour 's War, p.38. 
52 !bid, p.38.  
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between the two parties so strained, it is interesting to analyse the attempts at cross-
party co-operation that were directed at both a national and local level. 
CROSS-PARTY CO-OPERATION? 
AT A NATIONAL LEVEL 
Paul Addison has argued that one of the mental blocks to be overcome in thinking 
about wartime politics is the assumption that during a great crusade against evil, 
calculations of personal and party advantage had to be swept aside leaving the 
'national interest' as the sole guardian to action.53 The sources that are available 
prove the reverse. Every government department believed that in the interests of 
victory it should have a greater voice than some less vital department on a particular 
committee. Thus it was that the political parties jostled with one another to 
appropriate credit for their contribution to the war effort. Churchill himself wrote in 
March 1 942, 'that when the war was won the Conservative party would prove to have 
been the rock on which the salvation of Britain was founded and freedom of mankind 
was regained' .54 Chamberlain, had he lived, may well have agreed with Churchill's 
sentiments. The parties may have appeared to co-operate on the surface. However, 
this could not have been further from the truth. At a national level, part of the problem 
lay with Chamberlain's  rather disdainful view of Labour party policy. He once wrote 
that he 'dreaded the prospect of an ignorant, ill-prepared and over-pledged opposition 
coming to power in a slump' .55 Sir John Simon, a confidante of Chamberlain, wrote in 
53 Addison, The Road to 1945, p.62 . . 
54 !bid, p.62. 
55 Cited in K. Middlemass, Diplomacy of fllusion: The British Government and 
Germany, 193 7-1939, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972, p.56. 
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May 1 940: 'These Labour men, though many of them are good fellows, are extremely 
class conscious in the sense that they are always watching out for rebukes supposed to 
be addressed to their inferior intellectual equipment . . . when Chamberlain is faced 
with a half-baked argument, he exposes it. '56 Chamberlain's Chief Whip, David 
Margesson, wrote after his leader's fall: 'He engendered personal dislike among his 
opponents to an extent almost unbelievable . . .  I believe the reason was that his cold 
intellect was too much for them, he beat them up in an argument and debunked their 
catchphrases. ' 57 Attlee wrote that Chamberlain 'always treated us like dirt' .58 
Chamberlain did not envisage a total war. If he had, he would have set his course 
towards a coalition, with the aim of keeping events under the control of the 
Conservative party. In fact, in Chamberlain' s view, Hitler was bluffing and would 
dare not submit the people of Germany to the deprivations of a second conflict. He 
was inclined to argue, for example, that Hitler would shrink from air attack on Britain 
for fear of the consequences to German morale if Britain retaliated; instead Hitler 
would rely on propaganda. 59 
With the improved standing of Churchill was a growing consciousness amongst 
backbenchers of the potential threat Labour would pose after the war. Although for 
Conservatives, their concern was the prosecution of the war, backbenchers had 
occasion to notice the manner in which the opposition conducted themselves. The 
Labour leadership did indeed follow a policy of 'constructive opposition' ,  which had 
been underlined by the electoral truce of 5 September 1 939. At a parliamentary level 
56 Simon MSS: diary 9th May 1 940. MSS Eng. hist. D.85. 
57 Margesson MSS: Margesson to Baldwin, 4 March 1 941 . MRGN 115.  
58  Addison, The Road to 1945, p.6 l .  
59 Chamberlain MSS: NC to Ida Chamberlain, 5 Nov. 1 939, NC 1 8/1/1 129. 
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various Labour frontbenchers took up official contacts with particular ministers and 
departments. At the same time, Labour frontbenchers had used the demands of a 
successful war effort to justify socialist measures. Efficiency was the key point. Only 
'superior efficiency' would defeat totalitarianism, David Grenfell told the Commons 
on 1 4  September.60 Arthur Greenwood later stated that 'whether we are thinking in 
terms of war production or peace output the basic principles of Socialism ought to be 
applied in the interests of national efficiency' .6 1 The Socialist rhetoric of the 1 930s 
centred as it was on economic efficiency, was uniquely suited to the challenge of war. 
This was anathema to Chamberlain' s  own views of the how the problems of the war 
should be addressed. 
That the growing stature of Labour became apparent to a number of Conservatives 
once Labour joined the Churchill coalition in May 1 940 cannot be argued with, but 
what is interesting is that there were limited signs of this realisation during the period 
of the phoney war.62 In a questionnaire circulated by Somerset de Chair in November 
1 939 Norfolk Conservative activists were asked if they preferred a coalition 
government; 57 per cent said no, 1 4  per cent said yes, 23 per cent were unresponsive. 
Entertainingly enough, De Chair's constituency was a safe Tory seat and branch 
60 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, vo1.352, 1 4  Sept. 1 939, col.760. 
61 A. Greenwood, Why We Fight: Labour's Case, London, Eyre and Spottiswode, 
1 940, p. 1 93 .  
62 S.  Brooke, Labour's War, pp.34-5 1 .  
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secretaries were also asked if any increase in Labour support was perceived: 28 per 
cent said yes, whilst 60 per cent said there was no change or had forgotten. 63 
2. AT A LOCAL LEVEL 
The rather disdainful view of Labour that was reflected at a national level was 
reflected at local level as well. Sir Douglas Hacking, the Tory Party Chairman had 
sent a circular letter to all the constituencies requesting on behalf of the authorities 
that they close down for the duration of the war, 'in the interests of the economy'.  
However, as soon as Hacking had sent his letter, it  left him feeling greatly worried 
about the 'party's position' . He believed that: 
Whatever the duration of the war may be it will be disastrous if, when hostilities 
have ceased, we find ourselves confronted with a situation where the other 
parties are in possession of their organisation and ours have ceased to exist.64 
The letter from Hacking was followed by a circular from Sir Eugene Ramsden, 
Chairman of the National Union, to all associations, pointing out that the executive 
had passed a motion urging the continuation of activities during the war and the 
'disastrous' consequences for the party if activities were 'seriously impaired' .65 
Many local Conservative associations did cease political activity during wartime, 
feeling perhaps rightly that party politics could not be continued when the national 
63 See Mass-Observation archive, TB: file 5!H, 'Somerset de Chair questionnaire and 
responses Nov 39' .  Cited in Crowson's Facing Fascism, p.25 1 .  
64 Conservative Party Archive, CCO 500/1 19-Party Organisation in Wartime, 1939-
42, letter from Sir. Douglas Hacking, 12th Sept. 1 939. 
65 CPA: CCO 500/1 /9-Letter from Sir. Eugene Ramsden, 23rd Sept. l 939. 
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unity and moral of the nation was at stake. Some local associations co-operated with 
local information committees established by the newly formed Ministry of 
Information.66 In its circular of the 12 September, Central Office warned against the 
closure of local associations, stating the influence of other parties.67 Included in the 
circular was material relating to what other political parties were doing and saying 
about the war. By circulating this material, it was one way for the Conservative party 
to keep an eye on the other parties' activities. Hacking actually thought it unwise for 
any but the junior movements of the Conservative party to disband. One reason, it was 
argued, was that Labour was not yet fit to join a coalition government, therefore 
Conservatives had to remain active. At a meeting of the National Union executive on 
20 September 1 93 9, reference was made to the attitude of both Labour and the 
opposition Liberal parties and the view was expressed that ' it would be disastrous for 
our own party if we were not to make every effort to maintain the constituency 
associations during the war'. It was argued that the main function of the local 
associations was in order to undertake any national work that would be required of 
them and to be ready for any 'eventualities'. 68 Quite what is to be interpreted by 
'national work', presumably we are to understand that this means war work. 
Associations like Edinburgh North women's decided that with party politics in the 
wane, ' it would be a means of keeping in touch with our people, if a party or work 
parties could be arranged to do some war work, probably knitting war comforts for the 
66 I. Me Laine, Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of 
Information in World War 11, London, Alien and Unwin, 1 979, p.46. 
67 CPA: CCO 500/119- Letter from Douglas Hacking, 1 2th Sept. 1 939. 
68 CPA: Microfilm-National Union Executive, minutes of the 20th Sept. 1 939. 
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troops' .69 The Conservatives remained uncertain about Labour's stand on cross party 
co-operation and vice-versa. Hacking incidentally resigned in 1 942 after growing tired 
of urging restraint on the party.70 Labour' s motto at the beginning of the war was, 
'while it does not co-operate with the National government, it co-operates in the 
national interest' .  71 Many local associations continued to function until the fall of 
France in 1 940. After that point most appear to have forsaken all political 
undertakings. As one Chairman explained: 
We do not think it would be any good having a divisional council now. So 
many of them are doing war work . . .  and the women are working too that 
we think it would not be worth calling them and at the same time we feel 
sure nobody wants to think of politics now. 72 
Although many associations did cease activities for the war's duration, some eo-
operated with the local information committees established by the Ministry of 
Information. This was an attempt by the parties at a local level to work at cross party 
co-operation. 
69 Crowson, Facing Fascism, p. 1 69. 
70 Ramsden, The Age of Churchill and Eden, pp.24-25. 
7 1 CPA: CCO 50011 /9-extract from Daily Herald article. Contained in Hacking letter 
of 1 2  Sept. 1 939. 
72 Crowson, Facing Fascism, p. 1 69. 
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THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CROSS-PARTY CO-
OPERATION? 
There were moves to encourage positive co-operation between the parties at a local 
level. The local information committees were concerned with the political parties 
presenting a united platform in the localities, 'a means whereby the party machinery 
could be concentrated towards the national cause' .73 On the face of it the scheme 
appeared to suggest positive co-operation. It drew on the best ideals of local 
government and participation by bringing together various interest groups such as 
political parties, trade unions, business leaders, voluntary societies and the press. The 
idea was that whatever the shade of political opinion, each parliamentary constituency 
throughout the country would be united together in the war effort. There was initial 
reluctance on the part of Labour to co-operate, 'for fear that their hands would be tied 
if at a later date they wanted to criticise the government' . 74 The parties finally agreed 
to co-operate and by early October 23 committees had been formed and a further 100 
were in the process of formation and a further 500 were waiting at the initiative of the 
regional information officers. 
The purpose of the local MOl committees was to 'explain to the people the policy 
of the government, and the progress of the war, the industrial and economic measures 
which the government will have to take . . .  how the individual can and should play his 
part by carrying out government instructions' .  Great stress was placed on 'national 
unity' and the 'traditional love of liberty' . 75 However, national unity between the 
political parties was far from a reality. The reluctance of Labour to participate in the 
73 PRO INF: John Hilton to A.P. Waterfield, 2 Oct. 1939, INF 11295. 
74 PRO INF: John Hilton to A.P. Waterfield, 4 Sept. 1 939, INF 1 /295 . 
75 PRO INF: 'Notes for Speakers' ,  1 7th Sept. 1 939, INF 11294. 
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local information committees, which in the early days prevented the large-scale 
organisation of public meetings, was considered sinister by the ministry when 'a 
socialist meeting addressed ... by Mr. Hugh Dalton was packed out' .76 This 
reluctance of Labour to become involved in the local information committees was due 
to their insistence that independence had to be maintained: 'Even if the fa9ade of 
National Unity is thereby endangered and the party endures a temporary unpopularity, 
Labour' s  position as an alternative Cabinet in Parliament and an anti-national party 
must be made clear. ' 77 Labour felt that it had a chance to replace the Chamberlain 
government if it bided its time and protected this independence. Transport House had 
been sending similar messages to the constituencies. In September 1 939, it circulated 
a memorandum on the Ministry of Information, which stressed: 
The Labour Party retains its complete independence of the National 
government. It is that alternative government of the country with its own aims 
and policies. These must be kept continuously before the electorate, for, even in 
wartime, the party must be compelled to assume the responsibility of office. The 
more its principles can be driven home, the more pressure it will be able to exert 
while it in opposition. After the war, an election will rapidly follow. 78 
The fear within the government was that the Labour party was getting the upper 
hand. At a meeting of the Cabinet's Home Policy Committee in November, Lord 
76 McLaine, The Ministry of Morale, p.4 7. 
77 'Politicus',  'Labour and the War', Political Quarterly, 10 ( 1 939), 477-88.  Cited in 
Brooke's Labour ' War, p.39. 
78 LP A, memorandum on 'Ministry of Information',  n.d. (Sept. 1 93 9). Cited in 
Brooke' s  Labour 's War, p.39. 
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Macmillan brought up the question of public meetings and observed that as the 
Conservative and Liberal supporters had 'gone off on war service the field had been 
left open to the pacifist and communist elements'.  Lord Macmillan claimed that the 
Labour party members were both 'claiming credits for patriotic support for the war 
and at the same time were actively bidding support of the pacifist and defeatist 
elements' .  He ended by stating that 'unless steps were promptly taken there was a real 
danger that the Labour party would soon capitalise these advantages in furtherance of 
their general socialistic policy' . 79 The setting up of the local information committees 
represents some of the cross-party mistrust that existed at a local level. 
Lord Macmillan had in December 1 93 9  urged that 'Britain must be represented as 
fighting Germany on land, in the air, and at sea, ceaselessly, without remorse, with all 
her armed might, with financial resources, industrial manpower, and commercial 
assets, with all her idealism and determination.'80 Lady Astor expressed the view that 
the MOl was 'too insufficient and narrow for wartime' .8 1 Astor was sympathetic to 
broadcasting to the neutrals. To observers the government was failing to provide an 
image of idealism and determination. As one Norfolk Conservative explained, 'when 
more is heard of how the war is being won we can tell better if people are satisfied! 
The general feeling is we know too little' .  82 
Early indications suggested that most Britons supported the general manner in 
which Chamberlain was conducting the war. 83 However, Chamberlain was a 
79 McLaine, The Ministry of Information, p . 47. 
80 PRO INF: Memorandum by Minister of Information, December 1 939, INF l /94 1 .  
81 Astor MSS: Letter to Stephen King-Hall, MS 1 4/ 1 6/1/1 . 
82 Crowson, Facing Fascism, p. 1 80. 
83 As late as April 1 940 Opinion Polls seemed to suggest that Chamberlain still had 
an approval rate that was above 60 per cent, cited in Addison, The Road to 1945, p.78. 
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perceptive enough politician to realise how quickly public moods and appetites 
change. He was apprehensive that British pacifists would try to stop the war 
prematurely. He confessed that he had 'always been more afraid of a peace offer than 
of an air raid' , since ' it was too early for any hope of a successful peace negotiation, 
the Germans not yet been sufficiently convinced that they could not win' . In the space 
of three days leading up to Hitler's October peace offer, more than three quarters of 
the 2450 letters Chamberlain received from the public, in some way argued to sue for 
peace. 84 If Britain should suffer serious reverses, there was a possibility that this 
would find expression in Parliament. 
THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND PARTY PRESSURE ON THE 
GOVERNMENT 
If the war was to be ended by peaceful means rather than by military defeat, then 
some form of negotiation was necessary. There was no shortage of individuals, both 
public and private, who were willing to look for a solution to end the conflict and do a 
deal with Hitler. A considerable number of these were Conservative members of the 
House of Lords; Arnold, Brocket, Buccleuch and Westminster. There were also a 
number of MPs, -Culverwell, Southby and Ramsey- who were attempting to place 
pressure on individuals in government who might be influenced in coming to peaceful 
terms with Germany. Fears that a negotiated settlement might be concluded were 
heightened when Hitler offered peace terms on the 6 October, but Chamberlain 
rejected these six days later.85 The members of the war cabinet remained resolute in 
84 Chamberlain MSS: NC to lda Chamberlain, 8 Oct. 1 939, NC 1 8/1/1 1 24. 
85 Hansard, House of Commons Debates 5th Series, vol. 352, cols 563-8, 1 2  Oct. 
1 939. 
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their attitude towards so-called 'peace feelers' .  There was no question of accepting 
Hitler' s offer and the problem for Chamberlain was how to word Britain's  rejection of 
it. 86 Chamberlain, who had been deceived at Munich, was not about to repeat the same 
mistake. Some months later in response to a letter from a small group of peers 
suggesting that the time had come to negotiate with the present German government, 
Chamberlain wrote to Lord Arnold, 'I do not believe that until Germany gives proof 
of a change of heart a negotiated peace would be a lasting peace. '87 Halifax also 'felt 
that any peace proposals would have to depend upon not only on the actual 
propaganda that might be made, but, no less important, upon the confidence which 
they might inspire as to the good faith of the German government' . 88 Apart from 
Hitler' s half hearted peace offer, the only other 'peace feeler' seriously to interest the 
British government during the Phoney War was a series of communications, 
beginning in the Netherlands in mid-October, with sources purporting to represent a 
group of German generals opposed to Hitler. This contact led to the notorious 'Venlo 
incident' on 9 November, when two British intelligence agents awaiting a rendezvous 
with representatives of the German generals were kidnapped by the Gestapo in the 
Dutch border town of Venlo and taken back to Germany.89 The result of this 
unfortunate incident was a much greater degree of suspicion in future towards any 
peace feelers coming from Germany. Chamberlain as Prime Minister took a robust 
attitude such towards peace feelers; however, other leading ministers were more open-
86 See C. Hill, Cabinet Decisions on British Foreign Policy, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1 992, Ch 5,  pp. l 00- 145 .  
87 Chamberlain MSS: Chamberlain to Lord Arnold, 10  Jan. 1940, NC 7/ 1 1133/6. 
88 PRO FO 800/328 Hal/39/45 Halifax to Lord Gort, 3 1 /1 0/39. 
89 PRO FO 371123 1 07 C 1 9335/1 9335/1 8 contains details of the incident, including 
material, which has only recently been declassified. 
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minded. Both Halifax and Butler, as late as March 1 940, hinted that there were other 
'constructive forces' which would be prepared to talk to Hitler if they could be 
convinced that any peace offer he was likely to make was a genuine one.90 Butler, as 
Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, often gave the impression of being the 
Minister keenest to keep an open mind on how far the war could be taken.91 The 
Dukes of Brocket and Buccleuch lobbied him during the early months of the war.92 
Both were trying to persuade the Chamberlain administration to come to an 
understanding with Germany. Butler however said nothing that would commit the 
government towards any formal framework for peace proposals. In his reply to 
Buccleuch, Butler stated that 'nothing will be turned down flat and every point of 
view will be given consideration' .93 
Such lobbying was common in the early months of the war. Lord Rothermere had 
drafted a letter to Chamberlain putting forward the arguments for peace, but withdrew 
the letter at the last minute, judging that such a letter could damn a man.94 The various 
groups included a majority of the centre-right of British politics. There was the 
influential minority of its pre-war supporters in the City, in large-scale industry and 
amongst the landowning aristocracy who had never supported the war. After the 
declaration of war they worked for a cessation of hostilities and the rebuilding of the 
'Anglo-German connection' . The boundary between these various peace groups was 
90 S. Newton, The Profits of Peace: The Political Economy of Anglo-German 
Appeasement, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1 996, p. 1 5 1 .  
91 Butler and Halifax were still taking a similar line in the dark days of May 1940 after 
the formation of the Churchill Coalition. 
92 Butler MSS: The Duke of Buccleuch to Butler, 29 Sept. 1 939, RAB G1 0/18 .  
93 Butler MSS: Butler to Buccleuch, 3 Oct. 1 939, RAB G10/2 1 .  
94 24 Sept. 1 939  'draft' letter, Lord Rothermere to Neville Chamberlain in N.J. 
Crowson (ed.), Fleet Street Press Barons and Politics: The Journals of Col/in Brooks, 
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not always clear. The highest principles guided many of the pro-peace campaigners, 
but anti-Semitism often appeared to be one of the motivating factors in the lobbying 
of ministers. In letters written to Halifax during the early stages of the war, a 
'constantly recurring feature' was the belief that 'war with Germany would be ruinous 
to Britain's place in the world and only Jews and Communists would benefit' .95 The 
Duke of Westminster, who was an old personal friend of Churchill, allegedly told a 
meeting that Britain need not be at war with Germany at all, it all being part of a 
Jewish and Masonic plot to destroy Christian civilisation. The speech was reported to 
the war cabinet the following day and earned the Duke a rebuke from Churchill: 
'When a country is fighting a war of this kind, very hard experiences lie before those 
who preach defeatism and set themselves against the will of the nation. '96 
Lord Halifax, as Foreign Secretary in the Lords, took a leading role in taking on 
the quite formidable opposition to the war. On 1 2  September, Lord Hankey wrote to 
Halifax warning him of a 'somewhat defeatist and pacifist' meeting that had been held 
the night before at the Duke of Westminster's home Bourdon House. The government 
was kept aware of the group's activities because one of their number, Lord 
Mottistone, was in fact keeping Lord Hankey informed.97 The Dukes of Buccleuch 
and Brocket had attended as well as Lords Rushcliffe, Arnold and of course 
Mottistone. At the meeting, the former Conservative MP, Henry Drummond-Wolff, 
read out a highly defeatist paper.98 Drummond-Wolff was a friend of Goering and a 
London, Routledge, 1 998, pp.291 -292. 
95 A. Roberts, The Holy Fox: The Life of Lord Halifax, London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1 99 1 ,  p. 1 5 1 .  
96 PRO PREM 1/379, letter from Churchill to Duke of Westminster, 1 3  Sept. 1939. 
97 PRO FO 800/3 17, Hankey to Halifax, 12 Sept. 1 93 9 
98 PRO FO 800/3 1 7, Hankey to Halifax, 1 2  Sept. 1 939. 
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Tory Imperialist who had since 1 934 served on the Committee and Council of the 
Empire Industries Association (EIA), founded some fifteen years earlier to encourage 
closer economic links between countries of the Commonwealth and the Empire.99 
The EIA could in fact claim over 200 Conservative MPs amongst its members. Some 
of the proposals advocated by the EIA were not dissimilar to those that were 
advocated at the Ottawa Conference in 1 932, that of Imperial preference. However, 
some members like Drummond-Wolff, went further. Their contempt for laissez-faire 
on the one hand and socialism on the other had led them down the fascist path. 
Drummond-Wolff argued that the press only took the view that it was impossible to 
have peace with the Nazis because the Left and the Jews' controlled it. The war had 
been provoked by 'the money power' ; it would be supported by the United States, 
which represented the Capitalist economy, and the Soviet Union, 'whose dream is 
world revolution' .  He went on to say that Germany was invulnerable on land and at 
sea and that London was an easy target for air attack. These sentiments were approved 
by the gathering, which included Buccleuch, Arnold and Rushcliffe. 100 It is easy to 
dismiss such personalities as fading aristocrats on the fringe of British Politics. 101 
However, the support of Buccleuch tied them to the City and Court circles. Bracket 
was a landowner and before the war he had been a confidant of Chamberlain. The 
pro-peace cabal met again on 26 September. The meeting included a larger group 
MPs who were sympathetic to a negotiated peace. 1 02 For most of the time this group 
99 Newton, Profits of Peace, pp. 1 5 1 - 1 52 .  
1 00 PRO FO 800/3 1 7, Hankey to Halifax, 1 2  Sept. 1 939. Contains details of meeting. 
1 01 A number of historians have tried to play down the influence of the pro-peace 
cabal. Andrew Roberts in particular has tried to cite the Tavistock proposals as the 
work of an eccentric. See Roberts, The Holy Fox, p. 1 52. 
102 PRO FO 800/3 1 7, Hankey to Halifax, 26 Sept. 1 93 9. 
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of peace mongers usually pressed their case for agreement with Hitler through letters 
and petitions to the Prime Minister. On the 8 January 1 940, for example, Chamberlain 
was urged to undertake a peace initiative by Lord Arnold. 103 On 7 March Labour 
Lords Noel Buxton and Ponsomby supported by Tory Lords Aberconway, Arnold, 
Darnley, Harmsworth and Holden, called for a negotiated peace. 104 They argued that 
Hitler was increasingly concerned with 'the Western advance of Russia' ; he wanted 
peace and could be persuaded to withdraw from the non-German speaking parts of 
Czechoslovakia and Poland subject to international guarantees concerning general 
disarmament and access to food and raw materials. 105 The most publicly known set of 
peace proposals was to be brought to the public's attention by Lord Tavistock in early 
1 940. This attracted some extremists and others like Lord Darnley, who had been one 
of the signatories of the British Council for a Christian settlement in Europe. The 
proposals came from the German Embassy in Dublin. These included independence 
for Poland and Czechoslovakia, and general disarmament with in return Germany 
receiving her former colonies. Damley conveyed these proposals to Lord Halifax on 
January 1 9. Sir Alexander Cadogan, permanent secretary at the Foreign Office poured 
scorn over the authenticity of the document, and as to the intelligence of Tavsistock 
and Darnley: 
Pointed out to H. that the ridiculous paper given him on Fri- 'as from' the 
103 Chamberlain MSS: Private letter from Arnold to Chamberlain, to be signed by ten 
peers, 8 Jan. 1940, NC 8/24/1 . 
104 Lord Noel Buxton had been a Labour MP. He was on the pacifist wing of the 
Labour Party (his brother Roden became a Quaker), and his call for a negotiated peace 
mentioned was typical of similar efforts by that section of the Labour party at the 
time. 
105 PRO PREM 11443, letter from Lord Noel Buxton. 
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German govt-by X (from Y) was absolute bilge. Both X and Y are (a) 'pacifists' 
and (b) Half-wits. If the Germans want to say anything to us, they won't use this 
drain for their communication. Also why was the paper Roneo'd? (I should, 
very much like to know this !) . . .  106 
Tavistock and Darnley met Halifax on 24 January, with little headway being made. 
On 7 January Tavistock published a letter in Truth floating the idea of a negotiated 
peace. 107 He did not reveal the proposals. Tavistock continued to lobby Halifax, who 
on the whole maintained the courteous tone he used with all such correspondents. In a 
letter of 14 February Halifax expressed doubts about the authenticity of the proposals. 
Tavistock arranged to go to Dublin; he informed Halifax, who let him make the visit. 
At the end of February, the affair became public knowledge. On 28 February Cadogan 
learned that 'half wit Tavistock is bringing out a pamphlet' .  108 Once the pamphlet 
became public knowledge, the Press poured scorn over the proposals. Tavistock later 
brought out a pamphlet, which contained the full correspondence between himself and 
Halifax, entitled, The Fate of a Peace Effort. Andrew Roberts has made clear that this 
did little damage to Halifax as Foreign Secretary, whose non-committal replies had 
stayed close to the government line. 109 It did however damage the reputation of 
Tavistock, as it brought his views more closely to the public eye. The letters revealed 
106 D. Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, London, Cassell, 1972, 22 
Jan. 1 940, p.248. 
1 07 R. Griffiths, Patriotism Perverted: Captain Ramsey, The Right Club and British 
Anti-Semitism, 1939-1940, London, Constable, 1 998, p.2 1 3 .  
1 08 Dilks, The Diaries ofSir Alexander Cadogan, 28 Feb. 1940, p.257. 
1 09 Roberts, The Holy Fox, p. 1 52. 
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very clearly his pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic stance. 1 10 
There were a wide variety of pro-peace activities in the first nine months of the 
war; many of them were respectable. The boundaries between the various peace 
groups were unclear. However, what sometimes happens is that you can find earnest 
peace seekers becoming involved with more questionable persons and activities. For 
example, Lord Darnley' s involvement with Tavistock. Chamberlain certainly rejected 
the defeatism of the right-wing fellow travellers. It would now appear that the 
manoeuvring of Churchill into the premiership rather than Halifax was related to 
this. 1 1 1  However, Chamberlain remained convinced of his limited war strategy right 
up to the end. He saw no reason to intensify the war effort until the disasters of April 
and May 1 940 wrecked this strategy and his credibility inside parliament and 
throughout the country at large. How the government and the authorities viewed these 
people is somewhat unclear. What is clear is that the 'defeatist' element of the 
Conservatives posed little threat to security. The exception was Captain Ramsey, the 
MP for Peebles. In May 1 940 he was imprisoned for the remainder of the war under 
regulation 1 8B. 1 12 This was because of his involvement with the Right Club, which in 
September 1 939 could claim amongst its members a vice-chairman of the 
Conservative party and two government whips. 1 1 3 The Home Office regarded it as 
'designed secretly to spread subversive and defeatist views among the civil population 
of Great Britain, to obstruct the war effort of Great Britain and thus to endanger 
1 10 Griffiths, Patriotism Perverted, p.2 14. 
1 1 1 J. Costello, Ten Days that saved the West, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolcon, 
199 1 ,  pp.461 -464. 
1 12 Crowson, Facing Fascism, p. 1 77. 
1 1 3 These MP's were Harold Mitchell, Charles Kerr and Albert Edmondson. See, 
Newton, Profits of Peace, p. 1 53 .  
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organisation which had sought to avoid war between Britain and Germany by 
educating the British population about the true nature of Nazism and correcting the 
'false' impression advocated by the press. 1 14 Like the other 'defeatists' ,  Ramsey 
believed that the war was a deliberate Jewish plot to secure world domination. 
However, Ramsey, unlike Lords Westminster and Bracket (who were never interned), 
had little, if no access to the decision-making elites. Therefore when it came to his 
internment he had no influence and protection when the internment orders came 
through. 1 1 5 
For the rest of the party there was concern that this 'defeatism' might spread to the 
general public. It was a concern which was shared by the Ministry of Information, for 
those of a patriotic persuasion, like Leo Amery, this loss of public morale was due to 
the 'generally negative attitude of things, excessive concentration on "funkholism", 
the forbidding of meetings and the discouragement of volunteering' .  1 16 It has to be 
stated that the desire to secure an early peace with Germany was limited to a minority 
of Conservatives; the remainder were concerned with issues specific to the war effort 
and to making the British war machine more effective. Most Conservatives were 
interested in all aspects of the war, enquiring about its expected duration, the reaction 
to the possibility of fighting Bolshevik Russia, the position of agriculture, the health 
of the Labour party, the success of the government's war prosecution and popularity 
of ministers and their war aims, to the domestic concerns about ARP and 
1 14 !bid, p. 177. 
1 1 5 R. Griffiths, Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany, 
1933-39, London, Constable, 1980, pp.37 1 -372. He suggests that internment only 
removed the eccentrics and that the real sympathisers (mainly from the aristocracy) 
remained free for the duration of the war. 
1 16 CPA: 1922 Committee, 4 Oct 1 939, CPA/1 922CMMTEE. 
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evacuation. 1 17 
A 'PATRIOTIC' CONSERVATIVE PARTY 
Despite the suspicion and mistrust that existed amongst the political parties at both a 
national and local level, the sources available show that the Conservative party 
remained deeply committed to the war effort. Hacking always maintained that the 
Conservative party was ' a stabilising influence' and that one reason for keeping the 
local associations open was a way of assisting the war effort. This meant the local 
associations helping other associations like the Red Cross, the WVS and the ARP. 1 18 
There was certainly no message of appeasement coming from Central Office and the 
local associations. This is best reflected by the case of Cyril Culverwell, MP for 
Bristol West. 
The attitude of surrender adopted by some Conservatives was of great concern to 
others in the party. Amery considered this 'sorry defeatism' to be confined to a few 
persons, but was ready 'to rally all forces to scotch it' should it become serious. 1 19 
There was a concern that this 'defeatism' might spread to the publicY0 This was a 
view shared by the Ministry of Information. 121 The issue of Culverwell's pro-
appeasement stance had emerged during a debate in a secret session of the 1 922 
Committee on 4 October. 
1 1 7 Crowson, Facing Fascism, p. l78 .  
1 1 8 CP A: CCO 500/1 /9-Conservative Party Organisation in Wartime, letter from 
Hacking, 1 2  Sept. 1 93 9. 
1 19 Barnes and Nicholson, (ed.), Amery Diaries, 4 Oct. 1939, p.575, CPA 1 922 
Committee, 4 Oct. 1 939, CPA/1 922CMMTEE. 
12° CPA 1 922 Committee, 4 Oct. 1939, CPA/1 922CMMTEE. 
12 1  Me Laine, The Ministry of Information, pp.34-35 .  
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The minutes of the meeting revealed that Culverwell felt that Britain was heading for 
a disaster since 
The country in his view had been stampeded into war by the press, opposition 
and right-wing conservatives. Poland would never be restored, nor would we 
break through in the west, and the defeat of Germany would mean that Europe 
would become Bolshevik. It was folly to pursue the war and we should make 
peace, recognising Hitler's claim to Poland if he offered reasonable terms. 122 
Culverwell did receive some support from MPs, although it was decided that the 
Committee was wasting its time discussing the matter and proposed adjourning the 
debate. 123 Culverwell's enthusiasm for the Nazi regime had been public knowledge 
for some time. During the Munich debate he had denied German 'war guilt' for the 
191 4-1918 war and argued that the regime was only seeking 'her just rights' ,  which 
had been deprived by 'the stupidity of the allies' .  124 
Culverwell continued to advocate the benefits of a negotiated settlement outside 
the 1922 committee. As a consequence he incurred the wrath of his local Bristol West 
association. At a special meeting of the local executive, Culverwell was called to 
account for his opinions. He denied the charge of being 'a pacifist, pro-Nazi or pro-
German' and claimed to 'a strong and consistent supporter of Chamberlain'. Members 
of the executive who doubted if any guarantee given by Hitler as part of a peace deal 
could be trusted, Culverwell replied that 'he was only trying to correct the impression 
122 CPA: 1922 Committee, 4 Oct. 1939, CPA/1922CMMTEE. 
1 23 CPA: 1922 Committee, 4 Oct. 1939, CPA/1922CMMTEE. 
124 Hansard, House of Commons vol. 339, col. 1 07, 3 Oct. 1938. 
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that it was possible to build up a utopian Europe after the war' questioned him. He 
went on to say that 'the only peace worth while is by negotiation, coupled with 
guarantees, disarmament etc ' .  The majority of the executive was openly hostile to 
Culverwell. It was urged that Culverwell 'be severely reprimanded' and that the 
association to do 'something definite' about his position. This led to the forming of a 
resolution which expressed its disagreement with his views, and a further resolution 
been passed warning Culverwell not to expect re-selection. 125 In fact he was 
deselected in 1 944. 126 Therefore Central Office's stress on keeping the support of 
constituency officials had been highlighted by the Culverwell case. It is clear from 
this that Tory activists were not prepared to tolerate defeatist talk. 
In December, Scottish Conservatives urged 'greater efforts . . .  to counteract pacifist 
and subversive elements, and to keep up morale "on the home front"' .  In other local 
associations members were asked 'to quash defeatist talk' . The Maidstone association, 
at their March 1 940 AGM, passed a resolution that 'strongly' protested at the 
activities of the pacifist Peace Pledge Union, considering their attitude to be an ' insult 
to the great mass of British people',  and demanded 'that steps be taken drastically to 
curtail the potentiality of evil' . 1 27 For many Conservatives the arguments of 
Culverwell et.al were ignored for they believed that to submit to a fascist regime 
would entail the loss of the same liberties threatened by bolshevism. 
Despite the patriotic stance adopted by many Conservatives in Parliament and in 
125 Bristol West CA, special exec. 1 5  Dec. 1 939-these resolutions were confirmed by 
the AGM 6 May 1 940, 38036/BW/2(b). 
126 Bristol West CA, special exec. 22 May 
Down-Shaw, 6 June 1 944, 38036/BCA/1 (a). 
127 Crowson, Facing Fascism, p. 1 76. 
5 1  
1 944, 3803 6/BW/ 1 (b); 
� r  �  � 
Culverwell to 
the local associations there was still much criticism of the government's handling of 
the war. After the initial few months of the war Chamberlain did attempt to assert his 
leadership over the government and party by trying to create a truly National 
government. 
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CHAP TER T W O  
T H E  N A TI O N A L  GOVERNMENT A T  W A R, SEP TE MBER 
1 93 9  TO M A Y  1 940 
INTRODUCTION 
The lack of military activity during the opemng weeks of the war fuelled the 
suspicion in some areas that Chamberlain was seeking a peace accord with Germany. 
The delay in starting the war was evidence that the appeasers were trying for another 
Munich. The reality was rather different. The delay was necessary because of the 
British government's  desire to declare war in unison with France. Some 
Conservatives actually thought the delay was 'good moral propaganda' . 1  The fear that 
the government might opt for a negotiated settlement was heightened again when 
Hitler offered peace terms on 6 October, but Chamberlain publicly rejected these six 
days later.2 The belief that there were elements within the government who favoured 
coming to terms with Germany was not helped by a defeatist element within the party 
comprising of several Conservative peers and MPs. 
In reality, having embarked on a war, which they had tried so hard to avoid, 
Chamberlain and his colleagues were faced with a problem: how to win it. This 
chapter will examine Chamberlain' s attempts to construct an efficient working war 
cabinet and a 'truly' National government that included the leaders of all the main 
political parties and how his failure to do so undermined his position as Prime 
1 S. Ball (ed.), Parliament and Politics in the Age of Churchill and Attlee: The 
Head/am Diaries, Camden 5th Series, 9, 1 999, 2 Sept. 1 939, p.2 1 5 .  
2 Hansard, House of Commons Debates 5th Series, vol. 352, cols 563-8, 1 2  Oct. 1 939. 
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Minister. 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A WAR CABINET 
Chamberlain had begun to take steps towards setting up a war cabinet before the 
invasion of Poland. He had met Lord Hankey at 3.45 p.m. on 23 August, the day the 
Nazi-Soviet pact was signed. Hankey had first-hand experience of wartime command 
structures, having held the post of war cabinet secretary during the First World War. 
He had even written a book on the subject. Chamberlain was specifically looking for 
guidance on the creation of an executive body of ministers responsible for running the 
war. Hankey noted that Chamberlain seemed 'a good deal worried at the situation' . 
Hankey proceeded to describe Lloyd George' s  war cabinet. They also discussed the 
personnel for such a body. Chamberlain asked Hankey about his views on the 
inclusion of Winston Churchill and even Lloyd George (who in fact he loathed). 
Chamberlain stated 'that he would like to keep Sam Hoare out' .3 The following day, 
Hankey set out the main points, which he had made to the Prime Minister and sent 
them to Sir Horace Wilson. ' The object', he wrote, ' is to ensure that there is a body of 
Cabinet Ministers free to give their whole time and energy to the central problems of 
the war.' In a covering letter, he added: 'I  attach more importance to the human 
element, teamwork, goodwill etc. than to the actual machinery, and realise that the 
machine must be adaptable to the personnel working it. ' 4 
3 Hankey MSS: diary, 23 August 1 939,  HNKY 1/7. 
4 PRO PREM 1 13 84 Hankey to Sir Horace Wilson, 24 August 1 939, enclosed in a 
paper entitled 'A War Cabinet' . 
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Chamberlain took Hank:ey's advice seriously. In the days leading up to the 
outbreak of war, he proceeded to sound out potential members of a war cabinet. His 
thinking on the composition of such a body is revealed by a document, which can be 
found amongst his private papers.  The slip of paper is undated but clearly from the 
days before the outbreak of war. It lists Chamberlain' s  choice not only of war cabinet 
members, but also of all the ministers in his administration. His known desire to bring 
the Labour party into government, although as a junior partner, is revealed by a list of 
'Possible places for Labour' . Chamberlain had sought to allocate a seat in the war 
cabinet for Arthur Greenwood. Possible cabinet posts included the Ministry of 
Education, the Ministry of Economic Warfare, or the Ministry of Health. The 
Ministry of Transport was pencilled in for Herbert Morrison. At the top of the list 
Chamberlain has noted 'Try for 3 ' . 5 I have documented the Labour party 
unwillingness to j oin a coalition government in the previous chapter. These were 
posts that were significant in terms of the war effort although all the great offices of 
state remained in the hands of the existing Conservative dominated administration. 
One seat in the war cabinet would be unlikely to outweigh this. The Liberal party did 
less well than Labour. Sir Archibald Sinclair was to be given the post of Secretary of 
State for Scotland but declined to. 
Outside the war cabinet, the only significant addition to the existing administration 
was Anthony Eden, who was to replace Inskip at the Dominions Office. Like 
Churchill, Eden represented a focal point for potentially damaging criticism if left out 
of government. As a former Foreign Secretary, Eden might have found the Dominions 
5 Chamberlain MSS: Undated slip of paper, NC 2/29/3 7.  
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Office post a little beneath him. However, Chamberlain offered him the chance of 
regular attendance at the war cabinet, even though he was not formally a member of 
that body. Churchill was given a post in the war cabinet as First Lord of the 
Admiralty, although Chamberlain had originally offered him a post without portfolio.6 
However, Chamberlain felt that an unrestrained Churchill without departmental 
responsibilities would be interfering. Chamberlain was certainly partly successful in 
his reconstruction of the administration. The most dangerous of his Conservative 
critics had been incorporated into the government and were therefore constrained by 
the ethos of collective responsibility. However, the Opposition parties were still free 
to criticise the government. 
Following the example set by Lloyd George in 1 9 1 6, Chamberlain had at first 
envisaged creating a small war cabinet most of whose members, including Churchill, 
would be relieved of significant departmental concerns. In this plan, the three 
6 Churchill Papers CHAR 2/367 Churchill to Lord Stanhope, 4/9/39. Cited in R. Mee, 
'The Foreign Policy of the Chamberlain Wartime Administration, 1 939-1 940,' 
(University of Birmingham Ph.D. thesis, 1 999), p.9. In this letter to his predecessor at 
the Admiralty, Churchill stresses he had played no part in Stanhope's removal : 
' Indeed I had already accepted a deal in the war cabinet 'without portfolio' when a 
change of plan brought me into office. '  From this evidence it seems likely that 
Chamberlain did not relish the prospect of an unrestrained Churchill and therefore 
sought to anchor him to departmental responsibilities. 
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ministers responsible for each of the anned forces would have been excluded from the 
war cabinet. This however was not to the liking of the individual ministers concerned 
and it was only under pressure from them that Chamberlain, keen to avoid dispute 
with colleagues at such a critical moment, backed down. This was unusual for 
Chamberlain. The consequences of these developments meant that the war cabinet 
became a cumbersome nine-man committee of departmental heads. Listening to 
Chamberlain's first speech to the Commons after the declaration of war, Amery 
considered it 'good, but not the speech of a war leader' .  An experienced observer of 
political life from both the front and back benches for over thirty years, Amery 
thought that Chamberlain' s  oversized cabinet 'might work for a while, but I think I 
see Winston emerging as PM out of it all by the end of the year'. 7 
Hankey, due to his past experience, was made minister without portfolio. He was 
deputed to ' keep an eye on Winston'.8 Accordingly, under the terms of the 'war book' 
he compiled, all sorts of new ministries were created and staffed so that the machinery 
of government 'slid into a state of war with scarcely a ripple' .9 On Hankey's  advice 
Chamberlain arranged that the deliberations of the war cabinet should be first 
processed by a series of ministerial committees and classified by topic. Initially there 
were separate bodies for home policy, civil defence and priorities. To these were 
added economic policy and food. All military matters started on the agenda of the 
Chiefs of Staff sub-committee, which reported direct to the cabinet. This procedure 
7 Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), The Empire at Bay 1929-1945: The Leo Amery 
Diaries, 3 Sept. 1 939. p.522. 
8 Cited in S. Roskill, Hankey, Man ofSecrets Vo/ 3, London, Collins, 1 972, p.4 1 9. 
9 lbid, p.422. 
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was 'streamlined' by Whitehall and interposed five weeks into the war, an additional 
intermediate stage called the military co-ordination committee. 
The effect of this was that every operational issue of importance had to be tackled 
three times: by the Chiefs of Staff, then by the military co-ordination committee, then 
by the war cabinet. Professor Dilks has stated that: 'Chamberlain and others, 
mistrusting some of the First Lord's enthusiasms and believing him too ready to 
overrule advice, probably thought that the advantages of such checks outweighed the 
inconveniences.' 10 
Amery' s instincts about Churchill's suitability as a war leader reflected a marked 
shift in the First Lord of the Admiralty's prospects. In the last months of peace, 
Anthony Eden had commanded the personal adherence of a larger group on the 
Conservative benches than Churchill had. Eden was also thought to enjoy a wider 
appeal as a rival leader amongst the population. 1 1  However, unlike Churchill, he had a 
tendency to play down his abilities as a potential leader. His new position as 
Dominions Secretary meant that he was formally outside the war cabinet. The former 
foreign secretary's  decision to accept this comparatively junior role excluded him 
from the high table of the war's prosecution. It was accordingly viewed as a gesture of 
self-sacrifice and reflected his hard won sense of patriotic duty. For his own career 
prospects it represented the worst of both worlds: membership of the government 
10 D. Dilks, 'The Twilight War and the fall of France: Chamberlain and Churchill in 
1 940' ,  in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th Series, vol 28, 1 978, p.65 . 
1 1 An opinion poll in April 1 939 had suggested that Eden, far more than Churchill or 
Halifax, was the country's  preferred choice as the next Prime Minister. The opinion 
poll gave Eden 38 per cent and only 7 per cent each for Churchill and Halifax. Cited 
in H. Pelling, Winston Churchill, 1 974, rev. edn, London, Macmillan, 1 989, p.397. 
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prevented him from leading backbench discontent if events took a turn for the worst 
whilst exclusion from the war cabinet prevented him from developing his claims as a 
rival leader within the corridors of power. Unlike Churchill he had made himself 
irrelevant to the course of events. 
The refusal of the official opposition to join the government of national unity 
ensued that the Premiership and the leadership of the Conservative party remained 
indivisible. This left Chamberlain more vulnerable to attacks from his critics who 
were increasing in number on both sides of the House of Commons. The lack of 
leadership and direction itself led to another area of concern, namely, for what 
purpose was Britain fighting the war? 
WAR AIMS 
The British public received the declaration of war by Britain and France with sombre 
recognition. Observers noted the difference in reception between the declaration of 
hostilities and that of 1 9 14Y As the air raid sirens started wailing, the expected 
knockout blow was being unleashed. However, this proved to be a false alarm. British 
land forces would not commence battle for another six months. This created an 
unusual situation. Inskip admitted that it was an 'odd affair' and noted the words of 
one allied foreign minister who had 'heard of wars waged without a declaration of 
war but never of a war not waged after a declaration' . 1 3 
Chamberlain was deeply anxious about the war's possible length and its 
12 S. Ball (ed.), Head/am Diaries, 1 - 3 Sept. 1939, pp. l 66-67. 
1 3  Crowson, Facing Fascism, p. l 7 1 .  
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consequences. He continued his regular correspondence with his two sisters, Ida and 
Hilda, admitting that his life had deteriorated into 'one long nightmare' .I4 Despite the 
avoidance of serious fighting in the frrst six weeks of the war by the British and 
French forces, it did not prevent him from confiding 'how I hate and loathe this war. I 
was never meant to be a War Minister' . I s  After visiting the BEF in France in 
December 1 939, he reported back that 'it sickened me to see the barbed wire and pill 
boxes and guns and anti-tank obstacles, remembering what they meant in the last 
war'. I6 
Chamberlain may have loathed the fact that Britain was at war. However, he had a 
strategy, which he believed would be essential in the defeat of Germany. Chamberlain 
was wary of defming war aims in a public statement. He stated in the 9th War Cabinet 
meeting that 'he was unwilling it defme our war aims, as this might have the effect of 
tying us down to rigidly and might prejudice an eventual settlement'. I 7 Chamberlain 
instead maintained that the rapid armaments build-up in Germany during the years of 
appeasement would be whittled away in the months and years of conflict ahead. In 
contrast to the enormous reserves that Britain could extract from its vast empire, the 
Nazi Reich would weaken under the weight of an economic blockade. An armed 
stand-off between the two nations was encouraged rather than the launch of a 
premature assault on the German war machine that would then give it an opportunity 
to strike back before the allies had time to make up for their deficiencies in 
I4 Chamberlain MSS, NC to Ida Chamberlain, 10 Sept. 1 939, NC 1 8/ 1 . 1 1 1 6 
IS Chamberlain MSS, NC to Hilda Chamberlain, 1 5  Oct. 1 939, NC 1 8/ 1 / 1 125. 
I6 Chamberlain MSS, NC to Ida Chamberlain, 20 Dec. 1 939, NC 1 8/ 1 1 1 1 35. 
I7 PRO: War Cabinet Minutes 9, 1 1  Sept. 1 939, CAB 65/9. 
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rearmament. 
In July 1 939 Chamberlain had continued to believe that the peacetime rearmament 
programme would be sufficient to make Hitler 'realise that it will never be worth 
whi le ' .  His criticism of Churchill's arguments over rearmament was based on the 
assumption that 'you don't need offensive forces sufficient to win a smashing victory. 
What you want are defensive forces sufficiently strong to make it impossible for the 
other side to win except at such a cost as not to make it worth while. '  18 Chamberlain's 
assumptions underpinning this argument were that the French would hold off an 
assault in the west; Germany would be brought to the peace table by an economic 
blockade or an internal coup against Hitler and that Germany would be unable to 
withstand a war of three years duration. 'It won't be by defeat in the field, but by 
German realisation that they can't win and that it isn't worth their while to go on 
getting thinner and poorer. ' 19 Getting the German people to turn on Hitler was the 
goal . Encouraging an internal coup was the rationale behind sending the RAF over 
Germany to drop propaganda leaflets. Bombing the civilian population was seen as 
self-defeating as it would turn public opinion against Britain and in favour of Hitler. 
Chamberlain expressed his opinion in the war cabinet that the leaflet dropping 
campaign was a good form of propaganda and should be continued as and when 
thought fit. He felt that the Germans were clearly annoyed by this.20 This did cause 
1 8  Chamberlain MSS: NC to Ida Chamberlain, 23 July 1 939, NC 1 8/ 1 / 1 1 08. 
19 Chamberlain MSS: NC to Ida Chamberlain, 5 Nov. 1 939, NC 1 8/ 1 / 1 129. 
20 PRO : War Cabinet Minutes, 1 9  Sept. 1 939, CAB 65/1 7/39.  
61  
great concern to Hankey, nor was it received well by Chamberlain's  critics. German 
fmancial and economic problems were more severe than those faced by Britain, and 
German public opinion might well exercise a decisive influence as allied economic 
warfare began to hit back. Nevertheless, he feared, like Chamberlain the results of 
fighting a 'total' war. One thing was certain in Hankey's  mind (and one which all his 
colleagues despite there reputation as appeasers, were agreed upon) was that there 
could be no accepting any humiliating offer of peace which the Germans might see fit 
to propose once the conquest of Poland was completed. Hankey noted, 'To do so 
would reduce British prestige to a vanquishing point, lose us the confidence of all 
peace loving nations and place our future in the gravest jeopardy. '  The Allies must 
fight on. However, merely taking no action was 'unthinkable. We should become a 
laughing stock' .  Hankey's  solution was to pursue a war of nerves. It would consist of 
economic pressure combined with anti-Hitler propaganda. Hankey made it clear that 
this was unlikely to bring the conflict to an end. 'Victory can only be secured by 
concentrating a decisive force at the decisive point at the decisive moment', he 
argued. He went on to say that Britain and France did not have the decisive force. 
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'The decisive point is still uncertain . . .  The decisive time is certainly not yet.' 21 
Hankey's  appreciation puts the cautious British policy of the opening months of the 
war into perspective. Hankey was reflecting on the methods pursued and lessons 
learnt from the First World War. It becomes clear that this policy was followed 
because there was no real alternative. That the war could be won without carnage was 
attractive to the Prime Minister, as it was to many of his advisors and colleagues, 
including Churchill, who, whilst approving a more active procession of the war, also 
shared with Chamberlain the view that time and the French Army were invincible 
assets on the Allied side?2 ' It is in our own interest' , Churchill wrote to Chamberlain, 
'that the war should be conducted in accordance with the more humane conceptions, 
and that we should follow and not proceed the Germans in the process, no doubt 
inevitable, of deepening severity and violence. '23 Even Chamberlain' s stemest critics 
like Viscount Cranbome believed that the German blockade could be effective. He 
wrote, 'I believe that sooner or later she must be strangled. '24 Effectively Cranbome 
was not out of line with the government. Cranbome, although critical of sections of 
the British public's attitude to the war, supported the government' s line on the reply 
to Hitler 's  peace offer. He wrote, ' any essential condition for negotiations means 
having a German government that can be trusted. The German regime does not satisfy 
21 Hankey MSS: Paper on War Policy, 1 2  Sept. 1 939. HNKY 1 1 1 1 . 
22 Chamberlain did not in fact have a very high estimate of the French Army or the 
Maginot Line in 1 935-36. A cabinet memorandum of his at the time predicted that the 
Maginot Line would be sidestepped and that the British needed to build strategic 
bombers as a deterrent against German aggression. 
23 Chamberlain MSS: Churchill to Chamberlain, 1 0  Sept. 1 939, NC 7/9/47. 
24 Eden MSS : Lord Cranbome to Lord Salisbury, 23 Sept. 1 939, AP20/7/63A. 
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this' .25 
The question of what Britain was actually fighting for was the subject of many 
intense debates. The lack of commitment to war aims on the part of the government 
led to correspondence in the press calling for more explicit government guidance. 26 
Inskip wrote that 'the war goes on placidly and some people say that the public are 
bewildered. I would rather say they are indifferent' ?7 Was Britain fighting to destroy 
Hitler personally or to ensure the destruction of the entire Nazi regime? Many saw the 
war being fought to preserve liberty, both in Britain and the Empire. Lord Lloyd in his 
pamphlet, The British Case, believed that 
The people of the British Commonwealth are engaged today in a life and death 
struggle for a political principle necessary to the liberties and therefore to the 
prosperity and progress of the peoples of Europe. It is the principle of national 
independence. This principle is the sole guarantee of the survival of individual 
liberty in Europe. 
Lloyd drew his analogies from the Christian faith and played on the British sense of 
25 Eden MSS: Cranbome to Eden, Oct. 6 1939, AP20/7/66. 
26 Cockett, The Twilight ofTruth, pp. 151-152. 
27 Inskip MSS: diary, Oct. 9 1939, INKP 112. 
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fair play. Germany was a 'tyranny' determined to secure world domination. With the 
takeover of Austria and Czechoslovakia, 'the humanitarian motives of the German 
government could not be accepted at their face value by a world deeply disgusted by 
the steady growth of religious, racial and political persecution within the now 
enlarged political boundaries of the new Reich' .  The responsibility for securing 
'European freedom' rested entirely with Christian Britain.28 The government 
continued to remain vague in its definition of war aims. Others saw that Hitlerism was 
not the real threat but the whole German military machine. Sir Robert V ansittart 
warned against the widely held government view of separating Prussian militarism 
from Nazism. He stated that it was impossible to destroy Nazism simply by securing 
the disappearance of Hitler himself as 'There was not a single German of good sense. '  
Vansittart was notoriously anti-German?9 It i s  interesting to note that Hankey, whose 
sense of history came into play, also held this view. In one commentary, presumably 
written for private consumption, Hankey commented on the state of war. He made the 
comparison with Hitler and the Prussian aggressions of 1 864, 1 866 and 1 870.30 
When Lord Halifax addressed a meeting of the 1 922 Committee he explained that 
the government was seeking to improve its relations with neutral countries and that 
efforts were being undertaken to ensure continued Italian neutrality. As for the 
suggestion of an Anglo-Soviet alliance, Halifax believed that this would only be 
secure if the USSR was given permission to do as they pleased in the Baltic, which 
28 Lord Lloyd, The British Case, London, Eyre and Spottiswode, 1 939, p. 13  and 44. 
Includes an introduction by Lord Halifax. 
29 Vansittart MSS: diary, 1 0  Oct. 1 939, VNST 2/43 . 
30 Hankey MSS: general correspondence, 1 939, HNKY 4/3 1 
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would have ' stultified our whole position with regard to aggression' . Halifax went on 
to say again that Britain was wary of defining aims.3 1  
That Britain was now at war allowed Conservatives to unleash their hostility 
towards the German nation. Thus it was that the use of highly emotive language was 
used to rouse audiences against the Nazi threat. Churchill 's speeches were a good 
example of this. The emotive nature of some of Churchill 's  peacetime speeches was 
discredited as 'alarmist' .  However, during the war, Churchill's mastery of the English 
language made him a powerful speaker. During his first wartime broadcast, Churchill 
spoke of the allies' intention to prevent the 'Nazis carrying out the flames of war into 
the Balkans and Turkey' . He confidently predicted victory against Hitler 'and his 
group of wicked men, whose hands are stained with blood and soiled with 
corruption' . And stated that the British were 'the defenders of civilisation and 
freedom. '  In another broadcast, Churchill declared: 
The whole world is against Hitler and Hitlerism. Men of every race and clime 
feel that this monstrous apparition stands between them and the forward move, 
which is their due. Even in Germany itself there are millions who stand aloof 
from the seething mass of criminality and corruption constituted by the Nazi 
party machine. 32 
Some critics felt that the Churchillian rhetoric was over the top. Halifax once 
3 1  CPA: 1 922 Committee, 25 Oct. 1 939, CPA/1 922CMMTEE. 
32 M. Gilbert, Finest Hour, 1 939-1941, Winston S. Churchill VI, London, Heinemann, 
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complained to a friend during the Phoney War how Churchill's 'voice oozes with port 
and the smell of chewed cigar' .33 The BBC Director of Talks was concerned that 
'these broadcasts were giving the wrong signals to the Dominions, which makes one 
more doubtful than ever about the value of Churchill 's  broadcasts. In addition, of 
course, he managed to offend both Italy and the US in successive talks' .34 
Most people were convinced that Nazism was the real enemy. The real dilemma 
lay in defining the expected war aims once Nazism had been defeated. Some 
Conservatives saw a risk in emphasising the crusade solely against Hitlerism; for fear 
that another Nazi Government might replace it. This would invalidate the legitimacy 
of continuing a war, especially to American and Dominion opinion. Winterton 
believed that since the German people accepted that Hitlerism and the German nation 
were one, it had to be made clear what Britain intended: 
To smash both in overwhelming force. Then and only then can we both settle 
down. In peace in Europe. We do not want permanent enmity between Germany 
and us, but we are going to make it impossible for (her) to make another war of 
aggression. 35 
However, the government, until after the fall of Chamberlain, did not accept this style 
1983, p.50 and 8 1 .  
33 Roberts, The Holy Fox, p. 1 86. 
34 D.J. Wenden, 'Churchill, Radio and Cinema', in R. Blake and Wm R. Louis (eds.) 
Churchill, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1 993 , p.222. 
35 Hansard, House of Commons Debates 5th Series, vol. 360, col 1 1 68, 7 May 1940. 
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of fighting talk. The problems of the British position were summarised by Sir 
Alexander Cadogan, permanent secretary at the Foreign Office, when, at the end of 
September 1 939, Halifax asked for his assessment of war aims: 
I told him I saw awful difficulties. We can no longer say 'evacuate 
Poland' without wanting to go to war with Russia, which we don't want to 
do! I suppose the cry is 'Abolish Hitlerism'. What if Hitler hands over to 
Goring? 36 
The conclusion of the war cabinet was the vague idea that the purposes was to free 
Europe from the fear of German aggression and enable the populations to preserve 
their liberties and independence. This in short meant the removal of Hitler. As Halifax 
wrote, he 
. . .  wished to fight long enough to induce such a state of mind in the Germans 
that they could say they'd had an enough of Hitler ! And that point is not really 
met by talking about Czechoslovakia, Poland and all the rest of it. The real point 
is, I'm afraid, that I can trust no settlement unless and until H[itler is 
discredited. When we shall achieve this nobody can say, but I don't think any 
' settlement' is worth much without! 37 
36 Dilks (ed.) The Diaries ofSir Alexander Cadogan, 23 Sept. 1 939. p.2 1 9. 
37 Roberts, The Holy Fox, p. 1 85. 
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This basically meant that as long as Chamberlain remained Prime Minister the war 
would be confmed to Eastern Europe. The British government maintained the stance 
that Germany could only be brought to its senses by a short sharp shock. 
It is easy with hindsight to criticise the administration for its often confused and 
vague approach to the war. It seems clear that Chamberlain disliked action for its own 
sake. In a reply to Commander Stephen King-Hall, Chamberlain wrote that 'there is 
undoubtedly danger that public opinion may press, especially in France, for action for 
its own sake' .38 As for the leaflet dropping campaign, Chamberlain clearly wished to 
avoid the carnage of ' total' war by appealing to the German people. In a leaflet 
dropped over Germany dealing with the Prime Minister' s  speech of 1 2  October, the 
following passage was quoted: 
' We seek no material advantage for ourselves' , continued Mr. Chamberlain. 
'We desire noting from the German people, which should offend their self-
respect. We are not only aiming at victory, but rather looking beyond it to the 
lasting of a foundation of a better international system which will mean that war 
is not to be the inevitable lot of every succeeding generation. '39 
For Chamberlain, the inevitability of an escalation of war was less apparent. We 
know that from the letters to his sisters that he wanted an internal collapse in 
Germany, which would topple Hitler and bring into power a more moderate German 
38 PRO PREM 1 1436, Chamberlain to Stephen King-Hall, 1 April 1 940. 
39 PRO PREM 1 1442 : Letter from Campbell Stewart to Arthur Rucker, SECRET 
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leadership, with whom an escape from the madness of total war might be negotiated. 
40 However, by December 1939, Chamberlain was beginning to feel frustrated and 
had come to accept that German morale needed 'a real hard punch in the stomach' 
before the people would move against Hitler.41 British propaganda in the form of 
leaflet dropping was not enough to bring this about. Economic warfare on the other 
hand could have the right effect. Contraband control was introduced as soon as war 
broke out. It sought to cripple Germany's economy, and her ability to wage war, by 
preventing the importation of certain types of goods into Germany by sea. In reality, 
the range of goods defmed, as 'contraband' was so large that it amounted to a virtual 
economic blockade of Germany. Further economic measures against Germany were 
taken when an Order from Council, issued by the King on 27 November, authorised 
the seizure of all goods on ships sailing from neutral ports 'which are of enemy origin 
or are enemy property. '42 This unfortunately brought Britain into dispute with a 
number of neutral countries, with whom Britain had no reason to antagonise, and this 
led to widespread concessions, which although important, reduced the effectiveness of 
the Allied blockade. 
As long as Chamberlain remained as Prime Minister the war would be confined to 
Eastern Europe. The British government's attitude towards Germany was that of some 
young offender who could be brought to his right mind by a short sharp shock. This 
dated 1 8  Feb. 1940. 
4° Chamberlain MSS: NC to Ida Chamberlain, 8 Oct. 1939, NC 18/111124. 
41 Chamberlain MSS: NC to Ida Chamberlain, 3 Dec. 1939, NC 18/111133A. 
42 PRO FO 800/911 'Order in Council framing Proposals for Restricting further the 
Commerce of Germany' Statutory rules and orders 1939, No 1709, 27 Nov. 1939. 
70 
view did not resolve the debate about war aims, and criticisms of the government's 
approach were to persist throughout the months that Chamberlain remained Prime 
Minister. Lord Reith, the Minister of Information from January 1 940, was longing 
during mid-March for a 'concrete indication ... of the precise policy they intended to 
pursue to defeat Germany',  which would enable him to counter the 'general 
atmosphere of anxiety in regard to high policy and the conduct of the war in 
general'.43 These doubts were kept private. The public words of the government, with 
its broad emphasis on defeating Nazi aggression in Europe, suggested at least for the 
sake of national unity to accept the government's aims. By the time Churchill 
succeeded to the premiership the immediate war aims were much clearer, having been 
narrowed specifically to military issues of survival or surrender. 
During the debates about Britain 's war aims and war prosecution, these did not 
make Chamberlain's defeat and Churchill's succession to the premiership in May 
1940 inevitable. What was to prove crucial was the perceived suitability of a minister 
for conducting a war. Chamberlain had once commented that the nearer war came the 
better Churchill's chances of returning to office.44 Chamberlain's faith in Churchill's 
abilities as a government minister was to indirectly lead to his fall from office. 
THE GOVERNMENT'S PERFORMANCE 
At the outbreak of the war, Chamberlain's critics in the party were the same handful 
43 Wallace MSS, diary, 18 March 1 940, MS.Eng.hist.c.496. 
44 Chamberlain MSS: NC to Ida Chamberlain, 23 April 1939, NC 1 8111 1 095. 
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of backbenchers that had opposed the Munich agreement. However, they were no 
longer under the leadership of Churchill and Eden, who had now joined the 
government. Now there was developing a new kind of critic. Lady Astor, the 
Conservative MP for Plymouth Sutton and Cliveden hostess, added to the criticism of 
the Chamberlain administration. Before the war, Lady Astor had been strongly 
supportive of Chamberlain. However, her account of a private speech made by 
Chamberlain to the Conservative 1 922 Committee in November 1 939 was damning: 
The P.M spoke with vigour and he looked extremely well, but what he said 
depressed me more than anything else since the war began .. . He said that the 
critics had been confounded, and that the Axis instead of working was 
breaking . . .  he implied that the Government's policy had been definitely planned 
one carried out, and that we had entered the war fully prepared.45 
The 'Twilight War' was a strange time in British political life. Nothing was quite as it 
seemed and a degree of boredom had set in amongst both ministers and backbenchers 
alike. Astor's feelings about Chamberlain express some of that frustration. For those 
who had ministerial responsibilities there was work enough to complete. Yet for those 
without, Parliament became more of a sorting office for constituents' complaints. 
Around 90 government supporting MPs were on active service with the armed forces 
45 Addison, The Road to 1945, pp.65-66. 
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by January 1940, whilst many more performed some kind of home defence work.46 
Sittings were fewer at Westminster in wartime. For obvious reasons little strategic 
information was divulged. Ministers attended the Chamber simply to make statements 
about what their particular department was doing. Debate was almost non-existent. It 
was within this atmosphere of frustration that the Liberal Clement Davis with the 
Independent Eleanor Rathbone as Secretary founded the 'all action party group' in 
September 1939. It was in short a club for discontented MPs who could voice their 
frustrations about the progress of the war. Some unpleasant things had been said at a 
secret session debate during mid-December, but it is difficult to judge whether 
Nicolson's feeling that it marked 'a stage in the end of this administration'47 was more 
accurate than Channon's comment that 'the PM seems to be in even better form and 
fettle'.48 Inskip noted that the government's ' popularity rises and falls' and 'that the 
papers are grumbling about everything' .49 The excited speculation of September gave 
way at Christmas to gossip about the state of Chamberlain's health and about who 
was performing well or badly in the administration. 
The lack of military activity was perhaps one reason why boredom had set in 
amongst those in parliament. Adjusting to the terms of this strangely unwarlike war 
took time. Emrys-Evans complained bitterly to Eden about the 'sham' of ' parliament 
going on exactly as if we were at peace,' and that 'there is no reality about this 
46 !bid, p.69. 
47 N. Nicolson (ed.), Harold Nicolson: Diaries and Letters, 1939-1945, London, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967, 14 Dec. 1939, p.50. 
48 Rhodes James (ed.), ' Chips ', 13-14th Dec. 1939, p.278. 
49 Inskip MSS: diary 16 Dec. 1939, INKP/2. 
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activity' ,50 whilst Amery, who had been critical of Chamberlain' s  peacetime 
administration, now found it 'absurd that I should not be made use of .51 Therefore 
criticism of the government was becoming more widespread. The Ministry of 
Information was badly run and there was inter-departmental rivalry. With the war so 
remote, it is hardly surprising that politics seemed to take the same centre stage of 
interest as it did in peacetime. Hore-Belisha's sacking in early January was an 
example of this. Chamberlain had no wish to dismiss his Secretary of State for War. 
In fact, before Christmas he had expressed confidence in him. 52 Chamberlain had 
planned to move him in a reshuffle to either the Ministry of Information, or at 
Halifax's suggestion, the Board of Trade.53 The demand for his sacking was activated 
by the demands of the King and the generals, Lord Gort in France and General 
Ironside in London, although Chamberlain was publicly to deny that they had any 
such involvement in his sacking.54 Hore-Belisha had to go. Belisha was unwilling to 
accept a lesser post and resigned, although initially his resignation/sacking caused a 
sensation, it soon died down. Part of the reason, lay in the fact that Hore-Belisha had 
little parliamentary following. Chamberlain also gained confidence from dismissing 
Belisha and during the next month he appeared at his best. 55 Much has been written 
50 Emrys-Evans MSS: Emrys-Evans, E-E. to Eden, 1 7th March 1 940. Ad.MS 582242. 
51 Emrys-Evans MSS :  Emrys-Evans, E.E to Eden, 1 7th March 1 949. Ad.MS 582242. 
52 1. Macleod, Neville Chamberlain, London, Muller, 1 96 1 ,  p.284. 
53 Roberts, The Holy Fox, p. 1 92 .  
54 Inskip MSS: Diary, 8th January 1940. INKP 1 /2. 
55 Crowson, Facing Fascism, p. 1 89. 
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about Hore-Belisha's sacking by historians.56 They have argued that anti-Semitism 
prompted his departure. This is an important factor and should not be forsaken. 
However, his departure is important in that it was probably a factor in preventing 
Chamberlain from carrying out a much more 'daring project' to regenerate the 
government onto a truly 'national' status. 57 
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
Much focus has been given to Chamberlain's inflexible approach to the construction 
of the war cabinet. However, Labour's leaders would have perhaps been surprised to 
learn that the two bogey-men of the government, Hoare and Simon, were now 
regarded by Margesson as 'egocentric intriguers', whom he thought should be 'got rid 
of . 58 At the time of Hore-Belisha's removal, Chamberlain was planning to sideline 
Simon at the Exchequer and replace him with Lord Stamp. What were Chamberlain's 
motives for this? Perhaps he felt embarrassed by Simon's attitude leading up to the 
outbreak of war. 59 Montague Norman, the Governor of the Bank of England, wanted 
him sacked. Another intriguing possibility is that Chamberlain was thinking in terms 
of a reconstruction of the government on the lines of Lloyd George's radical war 
cabinet of 1 9 16. This could perhaps clear the path for some of Labour's leaders to be 
56 See, in particular Andrew Roberts, Eminent Churchi/lians, London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1 994, pp.30-33 and Crowson's Facing Fascism, pp. 187- 1 90, A.J. Trythall, 
' The Downfall of Leslie Hore-Belisha', Journal of Contemporary History, 16,3 
( 198 1 ), pp.391-41 1 .  
57 Chamberlain MSS: NC to Ida, 20 Jan. 1 940. NC 18/ 111 139. Chamberlain talked 
about making radical changes to the Government. 
58 Colville, Fringes of Power, 4 Nov. 1939, p.47. 
59 D. Dutton, Simon-A Political Biography, London, Amold, 1992, p.287. 
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drawn in. 
A major criticism of Chamberlain centred on his refusal to institute stronger eo-
ordination of the economy. In economic affairs there were several departments 
leading independent lives: the Board of Trade, the ministries of Labour, Supply, Food, 
Shipping, and Economic Warfare. They were co-ordinated by two committees under 
Treasury control: an official committee under the chief economic advisor, Lord 
Stamp, and a ministerial committee under the Chancellor, Sir John Simon. As the 
newly elected National Labour M.P., Stephen King Hall, observed, criticism fastened 
on to the inability of Simon to double the roles of minister in charge of the Treasury 
and the economic strategist. 60 Perhaps, this would clear the path for some of Labour's 
leaders to join a coalition. This was clearly an attempt by Chamberlain to assert his 
leadership. The government's popularity was by this time rather volatile. The 
appointments of Morrison, as Minister for Food, and Dorman-Smith at agriculture, 
were unpopular and deemed a weakness of the government. For critics of the 
government, this was evidence of the influence wielded by Horace Wilson and David 
Margesson, the Chief Whip. Margesson, however, felt that changes to the government 
were necessary and that Chamberlain was experiencing difficulties in finding men and 
women of sufficient quality for ministerial appointments, therefore 'it was considered 
that some accession of strength to the government might be found from importing one 
or two people from outside' .6 1 This was not a new concern for Chamberlain, for even 
in peacetime he had complained about the lack of young talent on the government 
60 Addison, The Road to 1945, p.65. 
61 Wallace MSS: Diary, 12 Nov. l 939, MS. Eng. hist. c. 495. 
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backbenches.  62 Under the pressure of wartime, Chamberlain was forced to look to the 
world of business for men he deemed worthy. This led to a series of men from 
business appointments. In January 1 940, Sir Andrew Duncan, Chairman of the 
British Iron and Steel Federation, became President of the Board of Trade and Sir 
John Reith, the former Director-General of the B.B.C became Minister of 
Information. 
In the months leading up to the war, Chamberlain had favoured Simon's supporters 
in his ministerial appointments. Simon, who as a National Liberal had been part of the 
National Government since 1 93 1 ,  had always felt that his influence on policy as a 
'Liberal' was important in a largely Conservative-dominated administration. In fact, 
Simon considered that the Liberals could achieve a lot more in co-operation with the 
Conservatives than remaining outside the government, as a Liberal. Simon was not a 
popu1ar figure within Conservative circles; neither was Hore-Belisha who was also a 
62 Chamberlain MSS: NC to Ida Chamberlain, 1 7  December 1 938, NC 1 8/1 / 1080. 
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National Liberal . Collin Brooks, a right-wing journalist, wrote that Belisha had grown 
'bumptious and cocky with office, and became just an impossible person with whom 
to work'.63 Simon's removal would have pleased a large body of the Conservative 
party and would have meant Labour leaders would have been happier to accept office. 
Chamberlain was aware of the politically damaging accusation that his government 
was not 'national' enough long before his critics could make that charge effective. 
That he was unable to transform his administration into a more 'true' ,  'genuine', or 
'real' National government was certainly a misfortune. Had his pursuit of Lord Stamp 
been successful, the Norway debate might have actually favoured Chamberlain, 
despite the division that followed it. The appointment of Stamp was based on the idea 
that non-political specialists could be made to appear positive in wartime. 
Chamberlain, like Margaret Thatcher, was very keen on appointing those outside the 
political arena who could bring their specialist knowledge to work in government. 64 
Chamberlain was also keen, like Thatcher, to de-politicise the Conservative Party by 
bringing in people who were not accountable to the electorate. This does not imply 
dictatorship; it had more to do with Chamberlain's belief in business and getting 
things done efficiently. He believed that such an ethos could be applied to 
government. Chamberlain, at the beginning of his premiership, had talked about 
63 N.J. Crowson (ed.), Fleet Street Press Barons and Politics: The Journals of Col/in 
Brooks, London, Routledge, 1 998. 7th Jan. 1 940, p.263 . 
64 Examples of this include Lord (David) Young's appointment as Secretary of State 
for Employment and later the DTI in the 1 980s. Lord Young was a businessman. 
Also, Sir Jefferey Stirling, Chairman of P&O from 1 986, who was an advisor at the 
DTI under the Thatcher administration. 
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moving away from the straightjacket of party politics.65 What was also useful about 
their non-political base is that they could be dismissed or forced to resign with the 
minimum of political fuss. 66 
Lord Hankey explored the possibility of an enabling bill whereby a peer might 
speak, but not be able to vote in Parliament. Hankey, who had served as the frrst 
Cabinet Secretary in Lloyd George's  war cabinet, had no doubt that 'Chamberlain was 
fully equipped to carry out the functions of a war Prime Minister' .67 John Colville was 
entrusted with the task of arranging discussions with Montague Norman, the 
Governor of the Bank of England, and Horace Wilson, about effecting the change. 68 
Stamp was in fact reluctant to become Chancellor and nothing came of the plan, 
although Hore-Belisha' s removal also played its part. It would look bad for 
Chamberlain if he had to dispense with another National Liberal member of the war 
cabinet. There were about thirty National Liberals. They could not both be axed at 
once. Thus, the 'daring project' that Chamberlain had envisaged resulted in the most 
minor of reshuffles. Oliver Stanley moved into the War Office, whilst Duncan took 
the Board of Trade. Lord Reith replaced Lord Macmillan as Minister of Information, 
65 See, Neville Chamberlain' s  Caxton Hall Speech, June 1 937 on accepting the 
leadership of the Conservative Party. The Times, 1 June 1 93 7. Ramsden, The Age of 
Balfour and Baldwin, p.356. 
66 Chamberlain had been briefly Director of National Service in the First World War 
and had been sacked by Lloyd George in 1 9 1 7. 
67 Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets i l l ,  p.427. The post of Cabinet Secretary was 
created in December 1 9 1 6. Hankey had been Secretary of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence since 1 9 1 2. He became the first Cabinet Secretary in December 1 9 1 6. 
68 Colville, The Fringes of Power, 28 Dec. 1 939, p.60. 
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changes that were badly received. 69 It should be pointed out that Stanley was not a 
businessman but a career politician. The appointments of the supermen were not 
successful. Neither man appeared comfortable in his post; both would remain in office 
only until Chamberlain' s fall from power. Emrys-Evans considered the appointment 
of Stanley as 'an astonishing appointment' . Stanley was 'a weak man,' and Evans 
could not 'help feeling that it is his weakness which has been his chief 
recommendation in the eyes of the PM' .  70 
The three ministerial changes that Chamberlain made were ineffective. In April 
1 940 he made some additional changes but the reception was not good after rumours 
abounded that he had offered Labour three seats in the Cabinet. 71 Kingsley Wood 
swapped places with Hoare, and Chatfield, who had thought his job 'superfluous' for 
some time, was sacked. 72 The effect of the April reshuffle carried two important 
consequences. One was that a large section of parliamentary opinion was not satisfied 
with the changes Chamberlain had made. Euan Wallace told Margesson that 'the very 
worst possible thing' was for ministers simply to 'exchange offices' .73 Lord Salisbury 
felt that public opinion was not appreciated; thus the decision was made to inaugurate 
the Watching Committee made up of both vocal peers and commoners. It was in this 
light that Tory ultras could now channel their weight towards criticising the 
69 Crookshank MSS, diary, 4 April 1 940, MS. Eng.hist.d360 f.55; Wallace MSS,diary, 
3 April 1 940, MS. Eng.hist.c.496. 
70 Emrys-Evans MSS: Emrys-Evans to Eden, 7 Jan. 1 940, Add. Ms.58242 f.20. 
71 Pimlott, Dalton, p.272. 
72 Inskip MSS: Diary, 9 April 1 940, INKP 2. 
73 Wallace MSS: Diary, 3 1  March 1 940. MSS Eng. Hist. 496. 
80 
government more directly. Its purpose was 'to watch the conduct of the war . . .  to 
make representations to the government where they consider there is a risk of 
mistakes being made or where it seems that the trend of public opinion is not 
appreciated. '74 The Watching Committee was formed around the Cecil family, and 
comprised members from both Houses of Parliament, it held its first meeting on 4 
April 1 940, and j ust days after another cabinet reshuffle had been badly received. 
Although the committee contained a number of potential critics of the government, it 
also contained potential loyalists and technical specialists. The blend of critics and 
loyalists was deliberately created so that all trends of party opinion would be 
represented. 75 
PERSONALITY AND LEADERSHIP: CHURCIDLL, CHAMBERLAIN AND 
NORWAY 
The war cabinet contained in Chamberlain and Churchill two natural driving forces. 
Although Chamberlain was not a visionary politician, he was masterful in 
administration, swift in the assimilation of detail and the execution of policy. He was 
also stubborn. The powers of the Prime Minister were at his disposal and he could 
rely on the steady solidity of the Conservative party in the Commons. An opinion poll 
in April 1 940 recorded a 57 per cent approval of his premiership. 76 Although an 
unspectacular leader, Chamberlain gave the appearance of quiet, middle class 
74 Emrys-Evans MSS, Lord Salisbury to Evans, 3 1  March 1 940, Add. MS. 58245 . 
75 Emrys-Evans MSS, Evans to Amery, 1 July 1 954, Add. MS.58247 f.22 
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assurance and decency. Churchill's talents were also varied. In the war cabinet he 
displayed his restless spirit and formidable powers of oratory. His department, the 
Admiralty, was considered to be the only service that possessed any glamour. It was 
also considered to be superior in relation to its German opposite number and offered 
the best chances for Churchill to launch some of the aggressive tactics that he had in 
mind. 
Churchill and Chamberlain worked well together in the new war cabinet, 
notwithstanding their continued rivalry in the execution of policy. There was a 
difference of attitude towards fighting the war and Germany. Chamberlain had stated 
the formal position of the British Government on peace on 1 2  October 1 939:  
Either the German Government must give convincing proof of the sincerity of 
their desire for peace by definite acts and by provision of effective guarantees of 
their intention to fulfil their undertakings, or we must preserve in our duty to the 
end.77 
Chamberlain was clear that the elimination of Hitlerism was the central war aim. 
Neither Chamberlain nor Halifax expected Hitler to become a reformed character, but 
Chamberlain especially clung to the belief that a total war could be avoided. 
Churchill, in contrast, felt that a long war lay ahead, and there was no way to avoid an 
all-out struggle. As he informed Roosevelt's envoy, Summer Welles, in March 1 940: 
76 H. Canrtil, Public Opinion, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1 95 1 ,  pp.96-97. 
77 Hansard, House of Commons debates 5th Series, Vol. 352, 12 October 1 939, 
col.568.  
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The objectives of the German people had not changed and would not change. 
These were world supremacy and military conquest. There could be no solution 
other than the outright and complete defeat of Germany; the destruction of 
National Socialism, and the determination in the new peace treaty of 
dispositions which would control Germany' s  course in the future in such a way 
as to give Europe, and the world, peace and security for 1 00 years. 78 
The difference of attitudes towards Germany was part of something wider. 
Chamberlain, Simon, Hoare and Halifax still believed in the liberal conservatism of 
the inter war years. They had learned to accept the limits of British power and to react 
to that with peace and morality. When challenged by the Congress party in India, by 
Mussolini in the Mediterranean, or by Hitler in Central Europe, they generally took 
the line of appeasement. Churchill 's  entry into the war cabinet meant the intrusion of 
a different kind of patriotism of the pre- 1 9 1 4  school. After the Munich agreement, 
Churchill had called for a 'supreme recovery of mental health and martial vigour' .79 
Although, like Chamberlain, he could operate with stealth and masterly delay, 
Churchill had an irrepressible urge to fly the flag and bang the drum. He was anxious 
to prove his loyalty to the Chamberlain team, and thus to work his passage back to 
respectability. Churchill could not help bursting into the language of Palmerston and 
78 Addison, The Road to 1945, p.83. 
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Disraeli. These few points show where Churchill differed from the majority of the war 
cabinet. However, Chamberlain had enough confidence in Churchill to make him 
effective chairman of the service ministers coordination committee in the April 1 940 
reshuffle. It recognised Churchill's public reputation for energy and drive in the 
conduct of war. It also sought to promote greater integration among the services when 
the plan to extend the theatre of war to Norway was made, as to demonstrate allied 
action mindedness and deprive Germany of iron ore. One of the problems with the 
ministerial reshuffle of April 1 940 was that the dust was never allowed to settle on the 
new ministerial arrangements for them to succeed. There was not enough time to 
identify scapegoats when things started to go wrong. Had the judgement been 
restricted to ministerial colleagues, service chiefs and senior civil servants, there can 
be little doubt that the blunders of the Norway Campaign would have been heaped on 
Churchill's shoulders, just as he had lost the same post over the Gallipoli fiasco in 
1 9 1 5. This would have been a fair verdict on the performance of the First Lord of the 
Admiralty in the spring of 1 940. His chairing of the military co-ordination committee 
caused such a 'pandemonium' that a semblance of order was only restored when 
Chamberlain reverted to chairing its meetings from 1 6  April. 80 Operationally 
Churchill was also at fault. His decision on 8 April to send all naval units to cover a 
breakout in the Atlantic, whereas in fact German warships were moving northwards 
towards Norway was a costly error.81 He was perhaps to blame for turning a setback 
79 !bid, p.83 
80 J. Wheeler-Bennett (ed.), Action this Day, London, Macmillan, 1 968, p.48. 
8 1 D. Irving, Churchill 's War: The Path to Power Vol 1, Australia, Veritus, 1 987, 
pp.236-237. 
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into a disaster through ' meddling' and his indecision over attacking Trondeheim in 
central Norway and thereby denying Germany the use of airbases there.82 However, 
Churchill was not to be made a sacrificial lamb a second time. He offended the other 
service ministers to the extent that they threatened resignation, exasperated the 
Admiralty staff and had rows with Chamberlain over the extent of his powers. 83 He 
also attacked the ' machine' that provided professional advice about the conduct of the 
war.84 At the same time he took careful steps to disassociate himself from 
Chamberlain' s  leadership by establishing contact with the Liberal leader Archie 
Sinclair, A.V. Alexander for Labour and Salisbury's Watching Committee.85 In this 
way a channel for counter-propaganda was established just at the time when defeat in 
Norway became public knowledge. At the end of April, the political question of 
whose head would roll rose to the surface.  Lord Dunglass, perhaps on instruction 
from Chamberlain, 'pumped' Channon on the prospects of deflating Churchill 's  ego 
and removing him from the Admiralty.86 At the same time Halifax noted that great 
efforts ' were being made to represent the Norwegian business as the result of timid 
colleagues restraining the bold, dashing, courageous Winston' .87 Thus it was with 
82 Chamberlain MSS: NC to Hilda Chamberlain, 4 May 1 940, NC 1 8/ 1 / 1 1 53 .  
83 J.A. Cross, Sir Samuel Hoare:A Political Biography, London, Cape, 1 977, pp.3 1 4-
3 1 5. 
84 M. Cowling, The Impact of Hitler, p.370. 
85 Their relationship predated this period. Churchill and Sinclair had served together 
in the First World War and Sinclair was Churchill 's junior during the Lloyd George 
coalition. There is no doubt that Churchill found his contact with Sinclair useful 
throughout the late 30s as well as during the 'phoney war' . 
86 Rhodes James (ed.), 'Chips ', 25 April 1 940, p.297. 
87 Roberts, The Holy Fox, p. 1 94. 
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some irony that the stage was set for the man chiefly responsible for military failure to 
emerge as its political beneficiary. It was of little matter that the Norwegian 
Campaign was not yet over and that naval successes would produce a more complex 
situation. What was important was that Chamberlain' s  critics were handed the pretext 
for their offensive. Provided they had a forum, the ' fishers in troubled waters' were 
organised and determined to press home their attacks. 88 They did not have to look far. 
The debate on the Whitsun adjournment, a scheduled parliamentary occasiOn, 
presented them with their opportunity. 
For three weeks during April and May 1 940 Churchill' s  standing had diminished. 
Each day had brought news of sinking, evacuation and casualties. Perhaps with some 
irony, the defeat in Norway seemed to rally support, not just for the government but 
also for Chamberlain' s own policy of detachment. On 5 March 1 940 Lord 
Beaverbrook had entertained the Independent Labour MP's James Maxton and John 
McGovem. McGovem attributes this statement to Beaverbrook: 
He could not see any alternative at that time but to negotiate an honourable 
settlement, retire behind our Empire frontiers, arm ourselves to the teeth, leave 
the continent to work out its won destiny and defend the empire with all its 
strength. 89 
This in part reflected some of C hamberlain' s sentiments, although he would have 
88 Wallace MSS: diary, 1 May 1 940. MSS Eng. Hist. 497. 
89 A. Clark, The Tories: The Conservatives and the Nation-State, 1922-1997, London, 
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stopped short of a negotiated settlement. According to A.J.P. Taylor, Beaverbrook had 
been against going to war. He did not believe that a strongly armed Britain was in 
danger from Germany.90 The issue of what 'the Beaver' was up to is an interesting 
one. It seems that he was offering to finance the ILP's  anti-war campaign, however, it 
was something that he was to later deny.91 Beaverbrook continued to defend the 
government in a leader page article he wrote in the Daily Express. 92 This all helped 
strengthen Chamberlain's hand. He dismissed the Norwegian defeat as ' a  minor 
affair'.  He claimed credit for the government that London was not been bombed - 'nor 
is it likely to be' . He cited the defeat of the U-boats, immense financial resources, the 
impregnable Maginot Line. This was a brilliant piece of propaganda and a robust 
defence of the Prime Minister' s  wartime strategy. Beaverbrook received a handwritten 
note from the Prime Minister - ' When so many are sounding the defeatist note over a 
minor setback, it is a relief to read such a courageous and inspiring summons to a 
saner view. '93 Churchill ' s  reputation at this point was in the shadow. As stated earlier 
the military co-ordination committee was in disarray and Chamberlain had himself 
taken the chair. Chamberlain recorded that: 
It is . . .  getting into a sad mess, with everyone feeling irritable and strained and 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1 998, p.203. 
90 A.J.P. Taylor, Beaverbrook, London, 1 972, p .  404. 
91 M. Davie and A. Chisholm, Beaverbrook:A Life, London, Hutchinson, 1 992, p.372. 
92 Throughout the Phoney War, The Daily Express was obstructing the war effort. It 
criticized the Blackout, and ran a campaign against food rationing. Cited in Chisholm 
and Davie, Beaverbrook:A Li fe, p.373 .  
93 Taylor, Beaverbrook, p.404. 
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with a general conviction that Winston had smashed the machine that we had so 
carefully built up 94 
Within forty-eight hours the political situation would change completely. There was a 
developing feeling of indignation at the Norway defeat. It was seen as a major 
humiliation of the world's greatest naval power. This was an instinct, which was to 
also afflict the Major government in 1 997. The general feeling was that the 
administration was decomposing. When the party of government is in such a state, 
members of parliament always find it difficult to resist an opportunity and make an 
impression on the passage of history. 
THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE NORWAY DEBATE 
The story of the two-day Norway debate of 7-8 May has often been told. It must be 
stated that the event, although a factor in Chamberlain resigning the Premiership on 
1 0  May, was not a cause of it. The extent of the rebellion is inflated. Historians have 
often accepted the rebels' version of events and in particular, their wildly inflated 
recollections on the number of government supporters who defied their Whips and 
voted with the Opposition or abstained. In some accounts the figure for Conservative 
rebels is made to be as high as 50. In others, stiffened by the findings of political 
science, the number of Conservatives as distinct from National Liberal or National 
94 Chamberlain to his Sister, 20 April 1 940, cited in Charmley, The End of Glory, 
p.3 87. 
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Labour rebels is somewhere in the forties.95 Dr. Crowson states that 'forty-four 
Conservatives had cross-voted and sixty abstained' .  96 Actually, a mere 3 8  MPs who 
took the Conservative Whip (of whom only 33 were Conservatives) voted with the 
Opposition and most of them were known rebels. There is no list of abstentions so 
calculating their number is difficult. However, careful examination reveals that the 
figure was no higher than 25 and was probably closer to 20.97 Therefore the scale of 
the rebellion is far less that it has usually been made out to be. In mythical terms, 
something like 1 00 government supporting MPs are supposed to have defied the 
Whips on 8 May 1 940 whereas, in fact, as James Stuart recorded, only 'some sixty 
Tories . . .  failed to support Chamberlain in the Norway vote' .  98 Stuart's  recollection is 
of course one among many. But that he was deputy chief whip only adds weight to it. 
The core of the opposition came from the Watching Committee: Amery, Cooper, 
Emrys-Evans, Law, Macmillan and Nicolson, most of whom had long accepted that 
Chamberlain must go, and had committed to voting against the government. Close 
allies and friends, including Lady Astor (who was married to a committee member), 
followed them. This enlarged group then brought along more Conservative 
backbenchers. 99 
95 Ramussen's ' Party Discipline in Wartime' analysis is still, despite its age and errors 
much relied on. 
96 Cited in Crowson, Facing Fascism, p. 1 95.  
97 N.Smart, 'Four Days in May: The Norway Debate and the Downfall of Neville 
Chamberlain' , Parliamentary History, 1 7, 2, 1 998. 
98 J. Stuart, Within the Fringe, London, Bodley Head, 1 967, p.87. 
99 L.Witherell, 'Lord Salisbury's ' Watching Committee and the Fall of Neville 
Chamberlain, May 1 940', English Historical Review forthcoming article. I would like 
to thank Dr.Witherell for granting me advance viewing of this article. 
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Another piece of enduring myth is the claim that the government's 'technical 
victory' by 8 1  votes was a moral defeat, as a majority well in excess of 200 should 
have been obtained. 100 This does not take account of serving MPs absences from 
Westminster, by-election changes in the 1 935 parliament and changes of party 
allegiance. Actually a majority of 1 00 would have been enough to persuade everyone 
-whether the government's supporters or critics of the security of Chamberlain's  
position. 
If the failed Norway expedition had been an isolated incident then it would have 
been unlikely to lead to the fall of the government. However, for many Conservatives 
it was perceived as yet another example of the weakness and ineffectiveness of the 
administration. From the outset of the war, Chamberlain appeared to act on the 
assumption that the National government would be able to continue running the 
country through a limited war, without major upheavals in the pre-war status quo. The 
major issue concerning the effectiveness of the personnel of the war cabinet and the 
supposed unwillingness of the government to take the war to Germany provided the 
right ingredients for discontent. War no longer required party politics but a 
government of national unity. This was a realisation that had dawned upon 
Chamberlain at the beginning of the war. However, his failure to broaden the 
government by bringing Labour into the wartime coalition made him more vulnerable 
to attack from the Opposition parties. In part this was due to his character, with its 
combination of vanity and shyness. 'Ungregarious by nature',  wrote Duff Cooper, 
Chamberlain 'never frequented the smoking room of the House of Commons, where 
1 00 Addison, The Road to 1945, pp.98-9. 
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Stanley Baldwin and Winston Churchill were familiar figures, often in the centre of 
groups which included political opponents' .
1 0 1  This failure to mix freely with his 
backbenchers had by 1 940 created the belief that the leadership was no longer 
receptive to criticisms. Chamberlain's own conservative conviction combined with his 
reserved nature tended to divorce him from many of the younger minds in the party 
whom he was inclined to dismiss as a disappearing lot. This emphasised the 
generation gap within the party. Many of those who were to rebel against the 
government were the foreign policy sceptics of the peace years, their sense of national 
duty under the pressure of war meant that they could no longer keep their criticisms 
private. The younger MPs who rebelled felt unconstrained by normal obligations to 
the party whip. This kind of behaviour would have been inconceivable in peacetime. 
MPs on war service attended the Commons infrequently. This denied them the normal 
channels of communication through which to express concerns over a period of time 
and lobby for a particular issue. If an MP were only attending for a special debate then 
a public registration of protest would have been perceived as a most profitable 
exerctse. At one extreme there were some Conservatives, like Richard Law and 
Ronald Cartland, who were so disillusioned with the state of the party that they were 
contemplating never returning to politics, which meant the action of cross-voting or 
abstention and its expected censure carried no risks. Whilst the Norway debate is 
important because it brought down a government, it perhaps should be viewed as an 
untypical example of the breakdown of a party system. 
1 0 1  D. Cooper, Old Men Forget, London, Collins, 1 953, p.1 88. 
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CONCLUSION 
This study has been an analysis of how a party and government responded to war. In 
the first months of the conflict there was some rallying to the government, and at least 
a veneer of party unity was restored by the reintroduction into office of Churchill and 
Eden. Conscious that victory could come only in a long war, for which economic 
resources would need to be carefully husbanded, Chamberlain still sought to avoid too 
abrupt a transition to a war economy, but this earned him the reputation more of a 
half-hearted warlord than of a careful planner. Amongst Tory circles only Churchill 's 
reputation rose during the 'Phoney war' , partly from a real zest for conflict and action 
which few of his colleagues seemed to share. This was a result of Churchill being at 
the helm of the one armed service that easily outgunned its German equivalent (so 
that the Navy alone won clear victories in the first year), 1 and partly because he 
managed quite brilliantly to remain loyal towards Chamberlain but at the same time to 
convey the impression that he would do the job far better than the incumbent. 
When boredom and frustration were followed in 1 940 by the humiliation of 
military defeat in Norway (for which Churchill was substantially responsible, but for 
which Chamberlain got most of the blame) and then even more seriously in France 
and Belgium, the slide in Chamberlain's fortunes turned into a collapse. He failed, as 
Asquith had done in 19 16, to take the advice that might have saved him, which was to 
reconstruct his government far more drastically than in 1 939. But Labour refused to 
serve under Chamberlain. However, from Chamberlain's  own private papers and from 
1 The Navy was involved in skirmishes, the most famous of which being the sinking 
of the pocket battleship Graf Spee in Dec. 1 939, whilst the RAF confined itself to 
dropping leaflets over Germany and the occasional Bombing raid. The British 
Expeditionary force remained inactive in France awaiting a German attack. 
92 
his conversations with Hankey, it seems clear that it was his intention to reconstruct 
the government on more radical lines. He failed to do so because of Attlee' s  veto on 
Labour members serving under Chamberlain. The drift of events should not be 
exaggerated, for far more Tory MPs still backed Chamberlain than opposed him; 
when he was eventually supplanted by Churchill, it was Chamberlain who was 
cheered from the Tory benches on his next appearance in the House and Churchill 
whose first speech as Prime Minister was received with Labour cheers and Tory 
silence. Nevertheless, the number of critics had grown substantially, many of them 
now the younger Tory MPs who were themselves in the armed forces and who 
returned periodically to the Commons to bemoan the lack of equipment, training and 
pre-war preparation in their own units. 
Chamberlain's control of his party was undermined in the early months of the war; 
this was partly as a result of pressure coming from two different areas of his party. 
The first was from those who believed that there elements within the government who 
favoured coming to a peace accord with Germany and who were putting pressure on 
government ministers to sue for peace. The second group were the foreign policy 
sceptics who held the lingering suspicion that Chamberlain was only half-hearted 
about his desire to pursue the war. 
During the years of peace there was no real doubt about Chamberlain's suitability 
as leader. Foreign and defence policies, though progressively more dominant in 
people' s  minds, were not the only areas of government policy. In domestic policies, 
the Chamberlain administration's achievements were considered sound. Certainly by 
1 939 Central Office (or more specifically the CRD) detected a change in public 
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opm10n that desired a greater stress on domestic reforms. 2 This development 
suggested that if the government expected to be returned convincingly at the next 
election then a revised domestic policy was required. It would only be in the 
atmosphere of war, when all aspects of life and government policy were subjugated to 
the war effort, that doubts about Chamberlain's  leadership abilities arose. Although 
Conservatives are strong on the idea of pulling together in a crisis, by May 1 940 a 
significant proportion of the Tory party felt estranged from the decision making 
process. The impression that Chamberlain and his closest advisors were impervious to 
backbench expressions of concern persuaded a small number that it was necessary to 
give the leadership a jolt. It was not the intention to bring down the government. For 
those Conservatives who had been the foreign policy sceptics during the years of 
peace, Chamberlain's weakness was already apparent, and the lingering suspicion that 
Chamberlain was only half-hearted about his desire to pursue the war was not easily 
dispelled. The apparent inability of the government to adopt a positive and 
constructive approach to various areas of the war effort, especially the economy and 
agriculture, when combined with the reverses in Scandinavia in early 1 940 created an 
atmosphere of despondency. This was compounded by Chamberlain's personality and 
the personnel problems of his cabinet. Although one speaker in the Norway debate 
suggested that these problems, if true, would have been reflected in his constituency 
postbags and they were not, many Conservatives were not so convinced. 3 
In the 'Norway' debate on 7 and 8 May 1 940 Chamberlain's attempts to use the 
peacetime party mechanism of whipping, and his personal appeal to the loyalty of his 
2 CPA: D.Clark to J. Ball, 28 Nov. 1 93 8, CRD l /7/35. 
3 Hansard: House of Commons Debates, vol.360, co1. 1 3 1 7  (Courthorpe ), 8 May 
1 940. 
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'friends' , struck the wrong note in a House profoundly worried about the threat to the 
national interest. Chamberlain's supporters recognised that Labour must be brought 
into office because of the benefit this would produce in encouraging trade unions to 
cooperate in the war industries, but Labour still refused to serve under Chamberlain 
because of his known contempt for them. Chamberlain's Chief Whip commented that 
his personalisation of policy disputes ' engendered personal dislike among his 
opponents to an extent almost unbelievable'.  4 This factor alone would have sealed his 
fate as a war minister seeking to unite the country, once Conservative MPs failed to 
sustain him with a united party of his own. 
4 Margesson MSS: Margesson to Baldwin, 4 March 1 94 1 .  MRGN 1 /5.  
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Appendix 1 -Selected individual mentioned in Thesis 
1) Members of the War Cabinet: September 39 to May 1940 
Prime Minister: Neville Chamberlain 
Chancellor of the Exchequer: Sir John Simon (National Liberal) 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: Lord Halifax 
Lord Privy Seal: Sir Samuel Hoare (from 3rd April 1 940), Sir Kingsley Wood 
Minister for Co-Ordination of Defence: Lord Chatfield (post abolished 3rd April 
1 940) 
Secretary of State for War: Leslie Hoare-Belisha (National Liberal) (to 5th January 
1940), Oliver Stanley 
First Lord of the Admiralty: Winston Churchill 
Secretary ofState for Air: Sir Kingsley Wood (to 3rd April 1 940), Sir Samuel Hoare) 
Minister without Portfolio: Lord Hankey 
2) Other Ministers and Senior Government Officials: (non-War Cabinet) 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs: Anthony Eden (allowed to sit in War 
Cabinet) 
Home Secretary: Sir John Anderson .(National) 
Minister for Economic Warfare: Ronald H. Cross 
Minister for Information: Lord Macmillan (to 5th January 1 940), Sir John Reith. 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: R.A. Butler 
Minister of Supply: Sir Thomas Inskip 
President of the Board of Trade: Oliver Stanley (to 5th January 1 940), Sir Andrew 
Dun can 
Chief Industrial Advisor: Sir Horace Wilson 
Attorney General: Sir Donald Somervell 
Master of the Rolls: Sir Wilfred Greene 
Minister for Transport: Euan Wallace 
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3) Members of the Foreign Office 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State: Sir Alexander Cadogan 
Deputy Under-Secretary of State: Sir Orme Sargent 
Assistant Under-Secretary of State: Sir William Strang 
Chief Diplomatic Advisor: Sir Robert V ansittart 
4) Miscellaneous: 
Secretary to the War Cabinet: Sir Edward Bridges 
Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister: Arthur Rucker 
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister: Cecil Syers 
Assistant Private Secretary to the Prime Minister: John Colville 
Ministry of Information: Charles Peake, E.H. Carr, Lord Perth 
Archbishop of Canterbury: Cosmo Gordon Lang 
5) Others 
Leopold Stennet Amery, MP for Sparkbrook, Birmingham 
Cyril Thomas Culverwell, MP for Bristol West 
The Duke of Buccleuch 
Lord Brocket 
Paul Emrys-Evans, MP for Derbyshire South 
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